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Equal Work, Comparable Worth and Disparate
Treatment: An Argument for Narrowly Construing
County of Washington v. Gunther
Paul N. Cox*
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibits, prima facie, the unequal
payment of compensation to employees on the basis of sex "for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility."1 There are four statutory affirmative de-
fenses to that prima facie prohibition: unequal payment made pur-
suant to a seniority system, a merit system, a system which mea-
sures earnings by quantity or quality of production and a
"differential based on any other factor other than sex."' In enact-
ing the Equal Pay Act, Congress considered and rejected a propo-
sal which would have imposed liability for unequal payment on the
basis of sex for work of comparable character on jobs requiring
comparable skills.3
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University. B.S., 1971, Utah State University,
J.D., 1974, University of Utah; LL.M., 1980, University of Virginia.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
2. Id. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (interpreting the four
exceptions to the Equal Pay Act prohibition as affirmative defenses). Compare Coming with
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (interpreting the defen-
dant's rebuttal burden in Title VII disparate treatment cases as a mere burden of produc-
tion to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action).
3. The Kennedy administration proposed bills which prohibited sex discrimination in
compensation "for work of comparable character on jobs the performance of which requires
comparable skills except where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority or merit in-
crease system which does not discriminate on the basis of sex." H.R 8898, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1962); H.R. 10266, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) in Hearings Before the Select Subcom-
mittee of Labor on the House Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 8898, 10266,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-10 (1962). Neither bill contained an exception similar to the fourth
"affirmative defense" in the enacted Equal Pay Act - an omission which would have been
more susceptible than the enacted version to a disparate impact interpretation.
The bill eventually reported out of committee also contained a comparable worth stan-
dard but was amended on the floor of the House by substituting an equal work standard.
108 CONG. Rac. 14767-69 (1962). The bill was, however, not reported out of conference
committee.
A bill containing the equal work standard was introduced and eventually enacted as the
Equal Pay Act in 1963. See infra note 147. The legislative history of the Equal Pay Act is
reviewed at length in County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 184-88 (1981) (Rehn-
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by contrast, renders it
unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation. . . because of such individual's
. . . sex . . . ."' The obvious distinction between the Equal Pay
Act prohibition and the Title VII prohibition is that the equal
work standard is applicable only to the Equal Pay Act. Liability
might therefore potentially be imposed on the basis of a compari-
son of work and skills in jobs which would be treated as entailing
unequal work for Equal Pay Act purposes.' There is, however, a
second "potential distinction between the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII. Compensation claims brought under Title VII are potentially
subject to analysis both under the disparate treatments and the
disparate impact 7 theories of discrimination.8 Although the Equal
Pay Act precludes employer reliance upon labor market compensa-
tion rates where the equal work element of the prohibition is satis-
fied9 and may therefore be characterized as prohibiting employer
quist, J., dissenting).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). A second prohibition renders it unlawful to "limit,
segregate, or classify. . . employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status... because of such individual's. . . sex ...... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(2) (1976). The latter provision has been identified by the Court as the source of dispa-
rate impact theory. See Connecticut v. Teal, 102 U.S. 2525 (1982); Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1977); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976).
And Mr. Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court in the latter two cases has suggested that
compensation claims should be evaluated only under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1977); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 137 (1976). See also Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir.
1977).
5. Alternative potential meanings of comparable worth or value theory are discussed
infra notes 115-44 and accompanying text.
6. Disparate treatment theory requires intentional discrimination. Intentional discrim-
ination is employer action motivated by illicit (e.g., gender) reason for that action. See
Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See
infra notes-92-100 and accompanying text.
7. Disparate impact theory is discrimination in the form of unjustified disparate con-
sequences of employer action not motivated by an illicit (e.g., gender) reason for decision.
See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982); New York Transit Authority v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See infra notes
100-15 and accompanying text.
8. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399 (1979); Newman & Vonhof, "Separate But
Equal" - Job Segregation and Pay Equity in the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. I. L. Rv.
269.
9. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974); Christensen v.
County of Washington v. Gunther
reliance upon a gender neutral rule or criterion in that relatively
narrow circumstance,10 the fact that employer reliance on "any
other factor other than sex" is an affirmative defense implies that
only a disparate treatment prohibition otherwise governs Equal
Pay Act claims."
The potential for conflict between the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII is addressed by Section 703(h) of Title VII in language consti-
tuting what is commonly termed the "Bennett Amendment":
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under [Title VII]5for an
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount
of wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees ... if such differ-
entiation is authorized by the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act]."'
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in County of Washington
v. Gunther,1 the Equal Pay Act's equal work standard and Title
VII's Bennett Amendment presented the primary legal obstacles to
the so-called "comparable worth" theory of compensation discrimi-
nation. The equal work standard precludes reliance upon compari-
sons of the worth of unequal work performed by males and females
and the Bennett Amendment was generally viewed as mandating
incorporation of the equal work standard into Title VII.'4 In Gun-
ther, the Supreme Court rejected the latter interpretation of the
Bennett Amendment by holding that only the Equal Pay Act's
four affirmative defenses were incorporated into Title VII by the
amendment. The Court therefore concluded that a compensation
discrimination claim may be established under Title VII by "direct
evidence" that a plaintiff's wages "were depressed because of in-
State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 n.7 (8th Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co.,
493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 241 n.12 (5th
Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hospital, 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970). But
cf. EEOC v. Aetna Insurance Co., 616 F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir. 1980) (payment of new em-
ployees at higher market rates not discriminatory in purpose or effect).
10. C. SuLLtvAN, M. ZImmR, R. RICH AS, FEDEmL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DIscMINATON 625 (1978) (arguing, in addition, however, that disparate impact theory
should be applicable under the E.P.A.). See infra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
11. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981); 1 A. LARSEN &
L. LARSEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCmUMINATION § 31.25 (1982); infra notes 154-66 and accompany-
ing text. But compare Gould, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Docket in the
1980 Term: Justice Brennan's Term, 53 U. COLO. L. Rv. 1, 66 (1981) (thrust of majority
opinion in Gunther rejects disparate impact theory for compensation claims) with Newman
& Vonhof, supra note 8, at 289 (applicability of impact theory was "reserved" in Gunther).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
13. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
14. See, e.g., DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 596 (8th Cir. 1978); Orr
v. Frank R. Neil & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 865




Because the Court declined to identify the scope or meaning of
"direct evidence" and distinguished comparable worth theory from
proof by "direct evidence" while apparently reserving the compa-
rable worth question, 16 Gunther raises and leaves unanswered a
number of important and difficult issues regarding the character of
the compensation claims assertable under Title VII and the nature
of the evidence admissible in proof of such claims.17 This article
explores some of these issues by arguing in favor of a narrow inter-
pretation of Gunther which leaves the Equal Pay Act's equal work
standard substantially intact in all but a narrow range of cases.
The thesis of the article is that, although the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the Bennett Amendment may be legitimately
viewed as a judicial abrogation of a clear legislative commands
that command may yet survive Gunther if the policy underlying
the command is both emphasized and utilized as a basis for inter-
preting the majority opinion in Gunther.
I. THE EQUAL PAY ACT
A. The Equal Work Standard and the Origins of the Gunther
Decision
In typical Equal Pay Act cases, jobs predominantly or exclu-
sively staffed by women are compared with jobs predominantly or
exclusively staffed by men. There is typically a core of identical
tasks or duties common to both jobs, but an employer will cite ad-
15. 452 U.S. at 166.
16. Id. at 166 n.6.
17. In particular, Gunther leaves the viability of "comparable worth" theories of com-
pensation discrimination uncertain. For useful treatments of the legal, definitional and eco-
nomic issues raised by such theories, see generally, CoMMrrrEg ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSWI-
CATION AND ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE (D. Treiman &
H. Hartmann eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES]; EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT ADvISORY COUNCIL, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (E. Livernash ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as COMPARABLE WORTH].
18. In the spirit of full disclosure, I note that I am in general agreement with Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Gunther. It is indeed a pity that the Justice fully expended the cri-
tique from Orwell in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219-20 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). This is not to suggest that I think Justice Rehnquist incapable of the manip-
ulation evident in the majority opinions in both Gunther and Weber. See Neuborne, Obser-
vations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 546, 554 & n.29 (1979). It is, however, to suggest that
Justice Rehnquist was in these instances in my view correct in his characterization of the
majority's methodology. See Cox, The Question of "Voluntary" Racial Employment Quotas
and Some Thoughts on Judicial Role, 23 AEIz. L. REV. 87, 175-78 (1981).
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ditional tasks or duties or distinct working conditions identified
with one of the jobs (normally the job performed by men) as ren-
dering the jobs unequal. 19 Judicial analysis proceeds by attempting
to characterize the additional or distinct aspects of the male job as
significant or insignificant within the rubric of the equal skill, ef-
fort, responsibilities and working conditions standard.20
A number of cases have relied, however, upon inconsistencies
and self-contradictions in an employer's compensation scheme to
conclude that jobs are unequal. 21 Two examples illustrate this reli-
ance. In Shultz v. American Can Co., 22 male night shift operators
of manufacturing machines did work equivalent, as a matter of
core duties, to female day shift operators of the same machines.
However, male operators were required to load the machines with
paper on the night shift, a task which varied in difficulty and dura-
tion of required time with the particular machine to which the em-
ployee was assigned. Female day shift operators were not assigned
the additional paper loading task. The court concluded that the
additional duty was not significant and that the jobs were there-
fore substantially equal. One of the grounds cited for that conclu-
sion was that "[aill night shift operators receive the same rate of
pay whether they spend a few minutes or thirty-three minutes per
shift in the handling and loading function, whether the rolls of pa-
per weigh fifty or fifteen hundred pounds, whether the rolls are
loaded manually or mechanically ... .
In Shultz v. Wheaton Glass,4 the employer claimed that the
work of a "female selector-packer" was not equal to the work of a
"male selector-packer" because the male was required to be availa-
ble to do the work of a "snap-up boy." Male selector-packers were
paid at a rate of $2.35 an hour, female selector-packers at a rate of
$2.14 an hour, and "snap-up boys" at a rate of $2.16 an hour. The
court rejected a contention that the additional "snap-up boy" du-
ties assigned male selector-packers rendered the latter work une-
qual to the work of female selector-packers on two grounds. First,
19. See, e.g., Usery v. Columbia University, 568 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1977); Brennan v.
Prince William Hospital Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply
Co., 454 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1971).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 209(d) (1976). See cases cited supra note 19.
21. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Shultz v.
American Can Co.-Dixie Prod., 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,
421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
22. 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
23. Id. at 361.
24. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
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there was no finding that all male selector-packers did "snap-up
boy" work and no finding of average or individual time spent on
such work. 5 Second,
[elven if there had been [such findings], there would still be lacking an ade-
quate basis for the differential in wages paid .... For there would be no
rational explanation why men who at times perform work paying two cents
per hour more than their female counterparts should for that reason receive
21 1/2 cents per hour more than females for the work they do in common."6
There are three possible explanations for this judicial emphasis
upon internal contradictions in the employer's compensation sys-
tem in evaluations of the equal work issue. First, it has been sug-
gested that such an emphasis states a "least different" principle-a
female job is to be compared to the male job involving duties
"least different" from those entailed in the female job.27 In Ameri-
can Can a female day shift operator's work was arguably compared
to the male night shift operator's work which involved the least
time and effort in loading paper. In Wheaton Glass, a female selec-
tor-packer's work was compared to the male selector-packer's work
presumed to involve the least "snap-up boy" duties.
Second, the cases may be explained on the ground that, because
the employer did not itself value the additional duty in a manner
consistent with a contention that it rendered the male and female
jobs unequal, the court will assume that the extra duty is insignifi-
cant.2 In American Can, the employer failed to differently value
the paper loading duty in a manner consistent with the contention
that it was rewarding extra effort. In Wheaton Glass, the employer
valued "snap-up" boy work at a mere two cents an hour more than
female selector-packer work.
Third, the cases may be explained on the ground that employer
inconsistencies indicated that the additional duty involved in the
male work in issue was a pretext for compensation based oh gen-
der; since the extra duty was not valued in a manner consistent
with payment for performing that extra duty, the employer- was
motivated by gender in making the compensation decision. The
Wheaton Glass court is quite specific in suggesting such a
rationale:
[T]hese disparities in rates of pay under which snap-up boys ... receive a
25. 421 F.2d at 263.
26. Id.
27. SULLIVAN, ZIMuR & RMCHARas, supra note 10, at 614-16.
28. See id. at 617.
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higher rate than female selector-packers while male selector-packers receive
a much higher rate because they are available to do some of the work of
snap-up boys, take on an even more discriminatory aspect when viewed in
light of their history.21
On its face, the third explanation postulates a non se-
quitur-because the employer was motivated by gender, male and
female work is equal. If the equal work standard is to be given
effect as an independent and essential element of the Equal Pay
Act prohibition, it must clearly authorize pay differentials founded
on gender where work is unequal.30 And to the extent that a
judicial finding of gender motivation is used as a basis for evaluat-
ing the equality of work, the equal work standard disappears as an
element of the Equal Pay Act.
There is, however, a rationale for the third explanation which
would render consideration of gender motivation in deciding an
equal work issue legitimate. It is apparent that a congressional goal
was to prohibit by the Equal Pay Act disparate gender treatment
with respect to compensation. 1 It is equally apparent that Con-
gress sought by the equal work requirement to avoid the complexi-
ties inherent in attempting to adjudicate claims for comparable
compensation for comparable work.32 Congress compromised the
goal of precluding disparate treatment because it wished to pre-
clude government regulation of work and pay valuation decisions.
8
3
29. 421 F.2d at 264.
30. See IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1100 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981); Gunther v. County of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303, 1313 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). It is however possible that liability may be established
under the Equal Pay Act by means of a hypothetical. If it can be established that a hypo-
thetical male would have been paid at a higher rate for work currently performed by fe-
males, there is arguably unequal pay for equal work. See Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co.,
617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980); Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978);
Peltier v. City of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1976).
31. See infra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
32. Brennan v. Prince William Hospital Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 285 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970) (recounting congressional rejection of comparable worth in en-
acting Equal Pay Act due to experience with complexities of regulation under National War
Labor Board attempt at governing compensation during W.W. IT). See also infra notes 144-
53 and accompanying text.
33. See 109 CONG. REc. 9197 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell, sponsor of the Equal
Pay Act). There is agreement between both advocates and opponents of the comparable
worth standard that Congress sought to preclude government standards of compensation.
See, e.g., Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth"
Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J. L. RFr. 233, 265-67 (1980); Blumrosen, Wage Dis-
crimination, supra note 8, at 475.
1983
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It therefore risked, and in effect "authorized,", 4 disparate treat-
ment where work is "unequal." Comparable work comparisons
were viewed as undesirable, however, primarily because they would
require a judicial or administrative analysis of jobs and a judicial
or administrative creation of standards for measuring comparabil-
ity.35 A case such as Wheaton Glass does not present that diffi-
culty. The inference of a gender component in the compensation
decision was there derived from evidence of the employer's actions,
not from an effort at independently evaluating the comparability
of male and female selector-packer work and the comparable value
of that work."
On these premises, it may be argued that the policy function
performed by the equal work requirement-avoidance of indepen-
dent judicial inquiry into the comparability of work and compara-
bility of compensation-is not threatened in a case in which a
court may rely upon evidence of the employer's actual behavior to
generate an inference of disparate treatment. In such a case, the
congressional decision to compromise the goal of precluding dispa-
rate treatment by limiting the scope of independent judicial in-
quiry into issues of valuation is not threatened."'
B. The "Any Other Factor Other Than Sex" Defense: The
Meaning of Disparate Treatment
One element of a prima facie case of an Equal Pay Act violation
is that unequal payment occurs "on the basis of sex.""5 That ele-
ment is satisfied wherever any male and any female receiving une-
qual compensation may be discovered. 9 A male executive vice
president may be compared for this purpose with a female file
clerk. If it is determined that the male and female employees
whose compensation is compared are engaged in "equal work," the
employer may establish an affirmative defense, one of which is that
the compensation differential was based on "any other factor other
than sex." '
34. Contra County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169 (1981) (interpreting
term "authorize" in Bennett Amendment as a reference to affirmative defenses rather than
to the equal work standard).
35. See infra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
36. See SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 617.
37. See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text for further development of this ar-
gument in the Title VII context.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
39. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188
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The "any other factor other than sex" defense appears to state a
disparate treatment standard."' Disparate treatment as a concept
is illicitly motivated action; in the present context, action moti-
vated by gender.4 Disparate impact, by contrast, is action moti-
vated by reasons independent of, e.g., gender which has an effect
on one gender group different in quality or quantity than its effect
on another gender group.43 If, for example, an employer decides to
compensate a category of workers (e.g., "executives") predomi-
nantly composed of males at a rate higher than a second category
of workers (e.g., "secretaries") because the employer believes that
the first category performs work requiring greater skill and respon-
sibility, or believes that the return it receives from the work of the
first category of workers is greater than the second, that decision is
motivated by a reason independent of gender (the employer's valu-
ation of the work performed) and has a disparate impact by gen-
der; males as a group are compensated at a higher rate than fe-
males as a group. If the employer instead compensates the second
category of workers at a lower rate because that category is
predominantly composed of females, the employer is motivated by
gender and therefore engaged in disparate treatment. The primary
policy justification for imposing liability only in cases of disparate
treatment is the preservation of the gender neutral interests fur-
thered by employer actions undertaken for gender neutral rea-
sons-including the controversial value of noninterference by gov-
ernment with employer discretion." The policies furthered by
imposing liability in cases of disparate impact include prophylaxis
(a prohibition of disparate impact captures otherwise undiscover-
able disparate treatment) and the shifting of the burden of histori-
cal societal discrimination from the race or gender groups ad-
versely affected by that discrimination to employers in the form of
the costs imposed by precluding employer pursuit of interests fur-
(1974).
41. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981); Coming
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 204 (1974) (although night shift is not a working
condition, it may be a factor other than sex); EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719 (4th Cir.
1980). But cf. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 206 (1974) (rejecting em-
ployer's argument that desegregation of jobs effectively cured shift differential which was
originally gender based).
42. See supra note 6.
43. See supra note 7.
44. See infra notes 144-53 and accompanying text. But see SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICH-
ARDs, supra note 10, at 625 (arguing that impact standard should be applicable).
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thered by gender neutral actions.""
Disparate treatment may be conceptually viewed in causal
terms. There is disparate gender treatment if gender status caused
a challenged employer's decision or action."" There are, however,
three distinct causal scenarios raising disparate treatment issues:
gender as a necessary and independent cause of an act; a legitimate
business reason as a dependent (on gender) cause of an act; and a
legitimate business reason as a pretextual cause of an act in fact
caused by gender. 47 These distinctions may be illustrated by three
cases.
Although the so-called "mixed motive" discharge" provides the
clearest example of an illicit employer reason as one of two or more
independent causes of an act, similar mixed motive problems may
arise under the Equal Pay Act. American Can Co.49 may be viewed
as an example. Assume that the employer in that case was moti-
vated both by gender and by a desire to compensate employees
working the night shift for extra (paper loading) duties performed
on the night shift. The employer's failure to differentiate between
the difficulty and time spent in loading different machines was evi-
dence that the latter of these reasons was pretextual, but that fail-
ure is explicable in terms of administrative convenience. If the ad-
ministrative convenience explanation is believed, the employer was
motivated by two independent reasons for its additional compensa-
tion, and the inquiry for disparate treatment purposes was which
of those two independent reasons-the legitimate reason or the il-
45. See infra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
46. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976); Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 773 n.32 (1976). Cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (unconstitutional motivation); Mt. Healthy City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (discharge for unconstitutional reasons);
NLRB v. Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981) (discharge for reasons rendered
unlawful by National Labor Relations Act).
47. Cf. Cox, A Reexamination of the Role of Employer Motive Under Sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 161 (1982)
(discussing disparate treatment in the context of the Labor Act). But cf. id. at 184 n. 113,
249 n. 332 (distinguishing meaning of disparate treatment in present context).
48. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(discharge for unconstitutional reasons); NLRB v. Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981) (discharge for reasons rendered illicit by Labor Act). The mixed motive discharge
problem arises where an employee's discharge was motivated both by an illicit reason (e.g.,
the employee's exercise of First Amendment rights) and by a licit reason (e.g., the em-
ployee's poor work performance). The question is whether an employer is liable if motivated
in part by an illicit reason or is liable only where the illicit reason plays a controlling or
necessary role in the discharge decision.
49. Shultz v. American Can Co., 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
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licit reason-"caused" the additional compensation. That inquiry
is difficult because it is apparent that both reasons caused the
compensation. In a case in which an employer's decision may have
only a dichotomous outcome (e.g., a hiring case or a discharge case)
the disparate treatment issue is whether the illicit reason was a
"but for" cause. 50 In a compensation discrimination case, there is a
continuous outcome."' A compensation differential is potentially
divisible into components attributable to differences in productiv-
ity and components attributable to gender. The difficult question
is whether there is a means of determining the gender based and
non-gender based components of the differential without thereby
imposing government standards for compensation in contravention
of the policies underlying the equal work element of the Equal Pay
Act."2
A legitimate business reason as a dependent (on gender) cause
scenario is illustrated by City of Los Angeles Department of
50. "But for" causation (illicit reason as necessary condition) is conceptually required
by a disparate treatment prohibition because disparate treatment is conceptually illicitly
motivated treatment. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10
(1976); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 773 n.32 (1976). Cf. NLRB v. Wright
Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981) (causation in context of prohibition of discrimination
under National Labor Relations Act). If a prohibition precludes any consideration of an
illicit reason for action even if the action would have been undertaken for licit reasons, it is
a prohibition of more than disparate treatment. See Cox, supra note 47, at 186-93. But see
generally Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A
Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUmB. L. REv. 292 (1982). Compare 29 C.F.R. § 800.141(a)
(1982) (factor other than sex can play no part of the basis for the wage differential) with
LARSON, supra note 11, at § 31.10 (position taken by Labor Department regulations is "ex-
treme" in the case of seniority plans). The complexities and difficulties of proof of causation
in the litigation process may warrant allocation of the burden of proof to the employer, but
such an allocation does not imply that such employer proof is merely proof of a "harmless
error" defense. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 630 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Disproof
of but for causation would appropriately occur at a remedial level only if the legal prohibi-
tion precludes any consideration of an illicit reason for action - possibly the case in the
First Amendment context. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977).
To the extent, however, that the decision in issue produces a continuous rather than di-
chotomous outcome, it may be possible to separate gender caused from non-gender caused
components of the outcome. See infra note 152.
51. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 12-13 (1980).
52. This difficulty arises under the Equal Pay Act in the context of the question of
remedy. See EEOC v. Whitin Mach. Works, 635 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir. 1980); Brennan v. Vic-
toria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974). Following Gunther, it may arise with
respect to the question of liability. Cf. EEOC v. Whitin Mach. Works, 635 F.2d 1095, 1100
(4th Cir. 1980) (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting) (factors other than sex argument is
appropriate to the issue of E.P.A. liability, not to remedy); Id. at 1101 (Widener, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
Duquesne Law Review
Water & Power v. Manhart.58 In Manhart, the employer required
its female employees to make larger contributions to a pension
fund than similarly situated male employees. The employer had a
legitimate business reason for that requirement. Because females
as a group live longer than males as a group, larger female contri-
butions were required to ensure both adequate funding for longer
periods of female retirement and the fiscal integrity of the plan.
This business reason for the larger female contribution was, how-
ever, dependent upon a conceptually antecedent gender reason for
the contribution. Thus, the employer could not claim that pro-
jected longevity caused the additional contribution increment
where the projection of longevity was itself dependent upon
gender."4
The relationship between the dependent cause scenario and the
pretext scenario is illustrated by Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes,
Inc.55 In Robert Hall, the employer operated a men's apparel de-
partment exclusively staffed with male employees and a women's
apparel department exclusively staffed with female employees.
These employees were found to be engaged in equal work, but were
paid at unequal rates. The employer defended an Equal Pay Act
claim on the theory that the men's department produced a greater
profit and this greater profit was a "factor other than sex." 6 The
plaintiff's counterarguments were that the greater profit generated
by the men's department was attributable to the employer's mer-
chandising practices rather than to the effort of the male employ-
ees and that the employer paid male employees a uniformly higher
rate than female employees without regard to differences in indi-
vidual productivity. The court accepted the employer's argument,
finding that "any other factor other than sex" means any other
53. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
54. Id. at 712-13. Manhart suggests that a disparate treatment prohibition is applica-
ble whether or not the employer's reason for its use of gender may be characterized as in
some sense prejudiced; arguably legitimate reasons for the use of gender are prohibited. A
rationale for justifying that conclusion is that decision makers - including courts deciding
application of prohibition questions - cannot be trusted to differentiate between good and
bad forms of race or gender based decision. See Cox, Book Review, 15 VAL. U.L. REv. 637,
648-59 (1981).
55. 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Brennan v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc.,
414 U.S. 866 (1973).
56. Although job segregation of the character evidenced in Robert Hall is prohibited
by Title VII, the segregation in issue was arguably justified under Title VII's bona fide
occupational qualification defense. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). But see Dothard v. Rawl-
inson, 433 U.S. 321, 346 n.5 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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factor.57
Two points of importance to the meaning of disparate treatment
may be made concerning Robert Hall. The plaintiff's first counter-
argument was clearly wrong and the court was clearly wrong. The
plaintiff's first counterargument was that the profitability of the
men's department was a function of merchandising methodology
rather than labor productivity. Such an argument is appropriately
made within the conceptual framework of disparate treatment the-
ory if it is characterized as a claim that the employer's rationale
for the compensation differential at issue in Robert Hall was
pretextual. The argument went beyond pretext however. It was
that "any other factor other than sex" means only any other factor
relevant to the labor component of production. The difficulty with
the argument is that it would prohibit employer reliance upon gen-
der neutral factors (in Robert Hall, profitability, if profitability is
assumed to be neither pretextual nor dependent on gender) having
a disparate impact on gender groups, where not justified by consid-
erations of labor productivity. Such a prohibition is not a prohibi-
tion of disparate treatment, it is a prohibition of undesirable con-
sequences not justified by a "business necessity."
The court's conclusion that the "any other factor other than
sex" defense was established in Robert Hall was plainly wrong for
two reasons. First, the court was wrong on a pretext theory because
the employer's failure to differentiate on the basis of individual
productivity obviated any claim that the compensation differential
was an incentive for productivity. If the differential was granted
independently of an incentive motivation, the sole remaining moti-
vation (other than an illicit reliance on market rates 58) was gener-
osity-an incredible proposition on the assumption that the em-
ployer was a rational profit maximizer. In short, the employer's
gender neutral reason for the compensation differential was not
credible; it was a "pretext" for a gender motivation."9
57. 473 F.2d at 594.
58. Recall that equality of work was assumed in Robert Hall.
59. See Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973). The distinction
between disparate impact theory and a pretext theory of disparate treatment is that the
former relies merely on the disparate effect of an employer action and the latter relies on a
finding that a neutral criterion was used to further an illicit motive. Unfortunately, this
distinction is not always observed in the commentary. Compare Newman & Vonhoff, supra
note 8, at 190 (reliance on "head of household" as a criterion for calculating compensation is
neutral factor having disparate impact) with LARSON, supra note 11, at § 31.25 ("head of




The court was wrong, however, for another reason. Although the
job segregation evident in Robert Hall was arguably defensible
under Title VII on a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
theory,60 there is no BFOQ defense under the Equal Pay Act. The
employer's stated reason for the compensation differen-
tial-departmental profitability-was dependent upon gender for
the same reasons that a longevity projection was dependent upon
gender in Manhart. Membership in the employee group to which
the facially gender neutral reason was applied by the employer was
a function of gender status in the sense that gender determined
membership in that group.
This last point is crucial to the present analysis of the meaning
of disparate treatment. The argument is that a legitimate employer
reason for a compensation differential falls within a disparate gen-
der treatment prohibition if that reason is itself dependent upon a
current employment practice caused by gender."1 Robert Hall
should, for purposes of illustration of that argument, be distin-
guished, however, from a case in which there is both gender based
job segregation and a merit or incentive compensation plan. If such
a plan is applicable on equal terms to both female and male job
classifications, there is clearly no disparate treatment in compensa-
tion, for incentive compensation is independent of job classifica-
tion. If such a plan is applicable only to the male classification,
compensation paid under the plan is for productivity itself depen-
dent upon gender. 62 The employer cannot in the second of these
hypotheticals claim that productivity is a factor other than sex
where the opportunity to satisfy the productivity standard for
compensation is itself a function of sex.6"
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2003-2(e) (1976). Gender may be used as a decision criterion if gender
is a bona fide occupational qualification. However, this exception to the disparate treatment
prohibition has been narrowly construed. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
61. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 31.25.
62. Cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) ("sex plus" discrimina-
tion in discharge decision); Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
"Sex plus" discrimination entails treatment of individuals differently on the basis of a
neutral criterion and gender where neither the neutral criterion standing alone nor gender
standing alone would result in that different treatment. Such a form of discrimination is
disparate treatment because the explicit or implicit rule underlying the employer's action
cannot be applied without reference to gender. See City of Los Angeles Dep't. of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 712-13 (1978).
63. Cf. EEOC v. Whitin Mach. Works, 635 F.2d 1095, 1101 (4th Cir. 1980) (Widener,
J., concurring and dissenting) (factor other than sex which is independent of source of dis-
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C. The Labor Market as a Gender Based Consideration
There is one and only one instance in which the "any other fac-
tor other than sex" defense may not be established by proof of
employer reliance on a gender neutral criterion. Reliance on labor
market rates is not a factor other than sex where work is equal.
There are two possible rationales for this result. First, reliance on
the market is reliance on sex and, therefore, disparate treatment;
or, second, Congress intended in the stated circumstance to pre-
clude reliance on the market even though such reliance does not
constitute disparate treatment. The latter of these rationales is the
more persuasive.
1. Reliance on the Market As Disparate Treatment
The argument favoring a conclusion that reliance on compensa-
tion levels established by the labor market is reliance on gender is
that the labor market is distorted by gender. Traditional and per-
vasive notions concerning gender role operate to channel most
women into a narrow spectrum of jobs thought appropriate to
women and operate to channel most men into a broader spectrum
of jobs thought appropriate to men. Because many women compete
for a limited supply of "female jobs" and very few women compete
for a larger supply of "male jobs," the normal operation of the laws
of supply and demand artificially depress compensation levels for
"female jobs" and artificially inflate compensation levels for "male
jobs." Moreover, the internalization of socially imposed gender
parate treatment and is responsible for compensation differential cannot be basis for Equal
Pay Act liability). But cf. Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441, 446 (4th Cir. 1981)
(back pay award calculated from base salary for male job restricted to males even though
experience criterion for compensation calculation was dependent upon job assignment). The
case coming closest to adopting this theory is Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041
(5th Cir.) (compensation not based on factor other than sex for Equal Pay Act purposes
where male work paid such compensation not open to females), cert denied sub nom. Behr-
ens Drug Co. v Brennan, 414 U.S. 822 (1973). See also Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647
F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1981) (relying on a Title VII job segregation theory for attacking a com-
pensation differential).
64. See Bergmann, Occupational Segregation, Wages and Profits When Employers
Discriminate by Race or Sex, 1 EASTERN ECON. J. 103 (1974). An independent argument is
that women, because influenced by societal role definitions, do not make the "human capi-
tal" investment decisions which enable men to command higher levels of compensation. See
Mincer & Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings For Women, 82 J.L
POL. EcON. 76 (1974). These and alternative theories for explaining male/female compensa-
tion differentials are surveyed in Kahne & Kahne, Economic Perspectives on the Roles of
Women in the American Economy, 13 J. EcoN. Lrr. 1249 (1975). Advocates of comparable
worth theory and of variations on comparable worth as a theory rely heavily upon the argu-
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role definitions causes women (or family units) to make human
capital investment decisions consistent with such role definitions."
The consequence of such investment decisions is lack of qualifica-
tion for jobs historically viewed as male jobs, and, therefore, a dis-
tortion in the labor supply for such male jobs.ee
Let it be assumed that this argument accurately describes the
state of the market. Notice what the argument does and does not
contend. Although it is possible to argue that market distortions
are in part the product of current hiring and job assignment dis-
crimination on the part of employers, 7 such discrimination is un-
lawful under Title VII. To conclude that current hiring and job
assignment discrimination significantly distorts the labor market is
therefore to conclude that current employer violations of Title VII
are pervasive - an unproven possibility at most. And even if that
possibility is assumed, such discrimination is subject to a direct
Title VII attack which avoids the acceptance and approval of hir-
ing and assignment discrimination implicit in an argument that
the market effects of unlawful job segregation should be challenged
as unlawful.
The distorted labor market argument does not, therefore, rely
primarily upon current employer hiring and job assignment dis-
crimination."8 It relies instead upon the propositions that current
ment that a "crowded" labor market is tainted by gender considerations. See Blumrosen,
Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, at 453-54.
65. The human capital theory, originally developed by Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer,
postulates that individual earnings are related to past investment decisions on the part of
that individual - investment, e.g., in education, training, and experience. See generally G.
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL - A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
To EDUCATION, (2d ed. 1975); Mincer, Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income
Distribution, 66 J. POL. ECON. 281 (1958).
66. See generally Mincer & Polachek, supra note 64. It is of course recognized by
human capital theorists that there are a number of complex and interrelated investment
variables and that such variables will not explain all components of a differential. Residual
components may at least in part be attributable to disparate treatment, although such dis-
parate treatment generally occurs in job assignment. See, e.g., Chiplin, An Evaluation of
Sex Discrimination: Some Problems and a Suggested Reorientation in WOMEN IN THE LA-
BOR MARKET 246(C. Lloyd, E. Andrews & L. Gilroy eds. 1979); Malkiel & Malkiel, Male-
Female Pay Differentials in Professional Employment, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 693 (1974). No-
tice that considerations such as continuity of employment, if used by an employer to assume
that women as a group will be only transient employees (rather than as a factual character-
istic of individual employees) constitute gender based grounds for decision rendering the
employer's use of such considerations disparate treatment. See General Electric Co. and
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 28 War Labor Rep. 666, 686 (1945).
67. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, at 445-54; Newman &
Vonhoff, supra note 8, at 312-13.
68. See WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 65.
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market conditions are influenced by the residue of past and non-
remedial job segregation decisions on the part of employers, 69 by
the internalization of limited gender role definitions by women
who continue to compete for a narrow spectrum of jobs consistent
with those definitions and by division of labor and human capital
investment decisions made by the family units in which women are
or have been members.7 0 In short, the proposition that the market
is synonymous with gender as a reason for employer decision rests
primarily on non-remedial historical phenomena and a current
self-selection phenomenon.
The market argument is, then, a form of dependent cause argu-
ment. An employer's legitimate business reason (expenditure for
labor not in excess of the price at which labor is currently availa-
ble) is dependent upon an antecedent series of decisions them-
selves caused by gender (historical job segregation decisions of em-
ployers and current job selection and human capital investment
decisions by women).
The flaw in the argument is that the antecedent series of deci-
sions which "cause" current market rates are not the employer's
decisions - they are phenomena external to the employer.71 It is
of course true that a similar characterization may be made of ante-
cedent gender causes of dependent legitimate business reasons in
contexts clearly amounting to disparate treatment. The fact that
women outlive men was an antecedent gender reason independent
of any employer decision in City of Los Angeles Department of
Water & Power v. Manhart.7 There is, however, a distinction of
importance between the antecedent gender cause at issue in Man-
hart and the antecedent gender causes of current market rates.
Longevity is correlated with gender - females as a group outlive
males as a group. In Manhart, the employer incorporated that ac-
curate generalization concerning the longevity of men and women
as groups into a decision making process concerning individual
men and women. It treated individual men and women differently
on the basis of group differences between men and women by
69. Such historical discrimination on the part of employers is arguably not remediable
because it occurred prior to the enactment of Title VII. See infra notes 253-66 and accom-
panying text.
70. See Mincer & Polachek, supra note 64. As Mincer and Polachek point out, the
significance of such decision making is a matter of one's definition of discrimination; "if
division of labor in the family is equated with discrimination, all of the [wage] gap is by
definition a symptom of discrimination." Id: at 104.
71. Briggs v. City of Madison, 546 F. Supp. 435, 445 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
72. 435 U.S. 702 (1978), supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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utilizing gender status as a proxy for longevity. By contrast, an em-
ployer who incorporates current market rates for different jobs into
its compensation decisions does not thereby treat individual men
and women differently on the basis of gender group status or char-
acteristics. Market rates for jobs are job specific, not gender spe-
cific. To illustrate, a female civil engineer will receive from an em-
ployer who relies upon market rates for civil engineers a
compensation level equivalent to the compensation paid a similarly
situated male civil engineer. An employer who incorporates market
rates does not utilize gender status as a proxy for a legitimate busi-
ness interest independent of gender; rather, it uses a gender neu-
tral criterion (the market) correlated with gender status as a proxy
for a legitimate business interest (minimum possible cost) indepen-
dent of gender.7 3
The difficulty with equating current market rates with gender is,
then, that such an argument relies upon a market phenomenon
correlated with gender status to contend that reliance on the mar-
ket is reliance upon gender. The essence of disparate treatment is
employer decision about an individual for group status reasons.
The gender cause of the employer's action must take the form of a
motivation for that action. The correlation between gender and
market rates for particular jobs is not a cause of a compensation
rate for a particular employee amounting to a motivation for that
rate unless the employer utilizes the market as a pretext for paying
at a rate it would not pay absent the gender status of that em-
ployee. The market argument is, then, a disparate impact argu-
ment. If reliance on the market is to be prohibited, it must be for
the same reasons that employer reliance on intelligence tests as a
criterion for hiring is generally prohibited under Title VII.7 4 The
disparate effect of such tests on protected racial groups is the
product of a correlation (itself attributable to historical discrimina-
tion) between group status and success under such tests.
2. Congressional Intent and Reliance on the Market
The second, and more persuasive reason that reliance on the
market where work is found to be equal may not be characterized
as reliance upon a factor other than sex is that Congress intended
that the market be equated with sex in such circumstances. The
73. See LARSEN, supra note 11, at §5 7-82 to 7-84.
74. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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reason for such a congressional characterization is not difficult to
discover. Despite the prior conclusion here that reliance on the
market is not generally reliance on gender and, therefore, that such
a reliance does not establish the illicit motive prohibited by a dis-
parate treatment prohibition, such a reliance where jobs are equal
is the functional equivalent of disparate treatment.
Reliance on the market in equal work circumstances is function-
ally disparate treatment for three reasons. First, if the work per-
formed by men and women is substantially equal but the market
pays at differential rates dependent upon gender, those rates are
not merely job specific, they are gender specific. The market phe-
nomenon at work in such circumstances is not merely a distortion
of labor supply, it is a gender specific distortion in which the mar-
ket is giving effect to tastes for discrimination independently of
any job specific supply phenomenon attributable to self-selection
or historical job segregation. 5 Where an employer hires men and
women for substantially equal jobs but pays women at a lower rate,
it is at least a fair inference that the employer has taken advantage
of an economic power obtained by a tacit agreement among em-
ployers (an agreement inferred by parallel behavior and a bias hy-
pothesis) not to compete for female labor. The employer has cho-
sen to refuse to deal with female workers except on conditions
inapplicable to males, and the employer is in a position to behave
in this manner because other employers have tacitly agreed to a
similar "boycott." Indeed, it is difficult to see how the employer
could apply a distinct market rate compensation criterion in equal
work circumstances without determining the gender of employees
and without, therefore, taking sex explicitly into account.Second,
reliance on the market in such circumstances is functionally
75. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974) ("The differential
arose simply because men would not work at the low rates paid women inspectors, and it
reflected a job market in which Corning could pay women less than men for the same
work").
Notice that this proposition assumes equivalent qualifications as between male and fe-
male applicants for employment or employees and assumes equivalent or nearly equivalent
job tasks, responsibilities, etc. Such equivalencies suggest disparate treatment because em-
ployers are in effect engaging in a concerted refusal to deal (or at least, a refusal to deal
except conditionally) with females. Cf. Pittman v. Hattiesburg Municipal Separate Sch.
Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981) (market rate may not be used if market pays
different rates for black printer and white printer). Where such equivalencies are not pre-
sent, it is possible to postulate a similar concerted refusal to deal, but it is not possible,
absent employer admissions, to establish such a refusal in the litigation process without
relying upon a judicially imposed standard of valuation for "comparable" work in place of
the market mechanism.
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equivalent to disparate treatment because the credibility of
claimed reliance is suspect. Where jobs are equal but men and
women are paid at different rates for performing those jobs, a mar-
ket reliance claim may be viewed as pretextual - the claim is in-
credible. 76 Even if it is assumed that compensation differentials in
an equal work scenario are the product of supply distortions, the
employer's conduct may be characterized either as irrational (it
employs men when it could employ women at a lower rate) or as
engaging in disparate treatment (it employs men at a higher rate
than the rate at which it could employ women either because it is
compelled to do so by government regulation or because it is satis-
fying a "taste" for male employees)."
Even if it is assumed that an employer is not, in any of the
above senses, motivated by gender in paying differential rates in
equal work circumstances, Congress may be viewed as having
sought to circumvent the market by means of employing a dispa-
rate impact standard in such circumstances. The unfairness of un-
equal pay for equal work warranted prohibition of market reliance
despite the absence of illicit motivation. On this premise, the cor-
76. The operation of labor markets is complex. See N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN,
THE LABOR SECTOR 322 (1971) (internal labor markets); Hildebrand, The Market System in
COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 17, at 88-94. It is nevertheless often possible for an em-
ployer to establish a market rate for particular work. Lemons v. City & County of Denver,
620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980) (wage surveys) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1981); Christensen
v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977) (employer could not obtain employees willing
to work at rate established by internal job evaluation for male dominated job). To the ex-
tent, however, that an employer establishes different (male and female) market rates for
substantially equal work, its claim that it pays according to market rates is a claim that the
market distinguishes between male and female workers performing substantially equal func-
tions. What such a claim appears to mean in fact is that more women are willing to do the
work than men and men must therefore be paid a premium to do the work. The difficulty
with such a claim is that is does not rely on an established market rate for particular work
so much as it relies on the employer's bargaining power - the power to refuse to deal except
on the condition of lower compensation - under circumstances in which it would make sense
to exercise that power against males. If males demand a premium and females are willing to
forego that premium, why does the employer not hire more females? See Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974) (state law precluded hiring women for night
shift and employer took advantage of lower market rate); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen.
Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970) (employer cannot use bargaining power in equal
work circumstances). In equal work circumstances, it is at best difficult to distinguish the
employer's actions with respect to gender from the market's decisions with respect to work.
77. State legislation often compelled disparate treatment prior to the enactment of the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
With respect to the theory, propounded within the neoclassical model of the operation of
labor markets, that discrimination is attributable to the satisfaction of tastes for discrimina-
tion (the tastes of employers, employees or customers). See generally G. BECKER, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
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relation between gender and current market conditions was
thought of sufficient import to warrant an irrebuttable presump-
tion of illicit motive in equal work circumstances. 8
Notice, however, that the equal work standard defines the
boundaries of that presumption. Absent equal work, the question
of "any other factor other than sex" does not arise. It does not
arise because Congress inserted the equal work standard for the
purpose of precluding judicial inquiry into issues of discriminatory
compensation except in cases satisfying that standard.7 9 Preclusion
was mandated for the reason that Congress feared the complexity
and uncertainty of inquiry into the question of the relative worth
of work and therefore wished to retain the market as a legitimate
mechanism for establishing compensation rates as an operating al-
ternative to that regulatory inquiry. The equal work standard au-
thorizes reliance on the market in the sense that it precludes a ju-
dicial substitution of a valuation scheme formulated independently
of the market in all circumstances other than equal work circum-
stances. And in that single circumstance, the statutory scheme pre-
cludes judicial reliance on any valuation scheme other than the
scheme utilized by the employer in establishing the compensation
rate for males engaged in equal work.80
II. COMPARABLE WORTH AND EQUAL WORK
A. Alternative Meanings of Comparable Worth
In general, comparable worth theory would compel equal com-
pensation for unequal (dissimilar) work of equal value to an em-
ployer and would compel compensation for unequal work of une-
qual value at rates proportionate to value. The essence of
comparable worth theory is that differences between distinct and
unequal jobs are not a legitimate reason for compensation differen-
tial unless those differences affect the value of the work performed
in those jobs. The primary difficulty faced by the theory is defining
the meaning of value. The neoclassical economic measure of value,
in which compensation rates are established by the market, is re-
jected by the theory because differences in the market rate for la-
78. This explanation of the congressional design comes closest to a pure disparate im-
pact understanding of the prohibition upon market reliance in equal work circumstances. It
is "unfairness" -a notion of impropriety founded upon premises about propriety indepen-
dent of the premise that gender based decision is improper -which is the basis for the
prohibition. See infra note 90.
79. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
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bor for different work reflect the distortions correlated with gender
earlier discussed here.81 The theory must therefore postulate a
means of ascribing value to work independent of the operation of
the forces of supply and demand. On the basis of the hypothesis
that compensation paid for work predominantly performed by
males is not affected by gender, that compensation is an available
benchmark for identifying the compensation which would be paid
female workers absent distortion."5 But what is needed, in addi-
tion, is a means of assessing the relative value of work performed
predominantly by females - a means of comparing the relative
value of work once some benchmark is established.
On neoclassical economic premises, an employer's demand for la-
bor is a function of the marginal productivity of labor; the value of
labor is therefore potentially the marginal revenue product of la-
81. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. The neoclassical version of the op-
eration of the labor market assumes both unlimited information and free competition. See
infra note 83. Institutional theories deny both assumptions. In particular, institutional theo-
ries in the present context argue that internal labor markets (selection and promotion from
within a firm), segmentation of labor markets into non-competing groups, collective bargain-
ing, and geographical and information bars to mobility often replace or significantly affect
supply and demand. See, e.g., WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 45-68; Bergman,
Occupational Segregation, supra note 64; Gordon & Morton, A Low Mobility Model of
Wage Discrimination- With Special Reference to Sex Differentials, 7 J. ECON. THEORY 241
(1974); Sobel, Human Capital and Institutional Theories of the Labor Market: Rivals or
Complement? 16 J. ECON. IssuEs 255 (1982).
The tainted market hypothesis supplies a reason for concluding that job segregation is in
fact due to "discrimination." See id. at 44-68; Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note
8, at 445-54; Bergman, Occupational Segregation, supra note 64; Oaxaca, Sex Discrimina-
tion in Wages in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKErS at 147-51 (A. Ashenfelter & A. Rees
eds. 1973). The difficulty with that reasoning is that the tainted market hypothesis is a
theory about wage differentials, not an established fact upon which a court formulating lia-
bility policies within the framework of legislation may reliably depend. Although it is of
course open to Congress to treat the theory as a "legislative fact" and to act upon that fact,
a court working within the framework of existing legislation (particularly where Congress in
the Equal Pay Act expressly rejected radical solutions to the problem of pay equity) lacks
both the information and the capacity to contemplate and accommodate the economic im-
plications of the remedies implied by the theory. See Nelson et al., supra note 33, at 290-97;
Hildebrand, The Market System in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 17, at 102-06.
In this connection, cf. Milkovich, The Emerging Debate, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra
note 17, at 42-46 (questioning measurements of the wage gap in part on the basis that such
measurements adopt a "macro" approach which falls to account for what occurs in individu-
al firms). Note that the existence of a wage gap relies upon differences in average earnings
between males and females within relatively broadly defined occupational groups, it does
not rely upon differences in rates of pay within the same or substantially similar jobs within
a single firm. See WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17 at 13-43.
82. See, e.g. WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 17, at 87-88; Blumrosen, Wage Dis-
crimination, supra note 8, at 496.
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bor.8 The difficulty with that possibility is that the marginal reve-
nue of labor in complex organizations is not practicably measura-
ble.8 4 There are two possible substitutes for direct measurement of
productivity. The first, identifiable with human capital theory, is
that the characteristics of workers (e.g., worker investments in ed-
ucation, job training, and years of work experience), may be used
as proxies for estimating the productivity of those workers.8 5 The
83. An employer's demand for labor where capital input (technology, land, etc.) is held
constant is determined by the additional product output (marginal product) an additional
employee (or additional hours of labor) will generate. The value or worth of an employee to
the employer is the revenue an employee's marginal product will bring to the firm (marginal
revenue product or marginal product multiplied by market price of the product).
Given the law of diminishing returns, adding employees will at some point actually dimin-
ish output. Marginal product will at first rise and later decline as labor is added. Total
product output will increase until marginal product becomes negative. Total product output
then declines.
If labor is free, the employer will hire up to the point at which marginal product is zero.
Under conditions of perfect competition, the employer will stop hiring at the point at which
the market determined wage rate for an additional employee exceeds that employee's margi-
nal revenue product, and all employees actually hired will therefore be compensated at a
rate not in excess of the marginal revenue product of the last employee hired. Excess margi-
nal product (the higher marginal product generated by employees hired earlier) becomes a
payment to capital services (depreciation, interest and profit). See A. REEs, THE EcONOMICS
OF WORK AND PAY 53-67 (1979); P. SAMUELSON, EcONoMIcs 541-44, 546 (10th ed. 1976).
Note that the marginal product theory is a theory of the demand for labor (or other in-
puts of production) rather than a theory of wages; wages are the product of the interaction
of demand and supply. REES at 54. Moreover, as an explanation of compensation it has been
subjected to attack on the theory that institutional phenomena rather than the laws of sup-
ply and demand control compensation levels and disparities. See generally A. TOLLES, ORI-
GINS OF MODERN WAGE THEORIES 51-66, 188-97 (1964); WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra
note 17, at 44-68; Darity, The Human Capital Approach To Black-White Earnings Ine-
quality: Some Unsettled Questions, 17 J. Human Resources 72 (1980). However, if for pre-
sent purposes the capital contribution to output is held constant and the market or artifi-
cially imposed wage rate (cost of labor input) is ignored, the value of an employee's labor is
arguably the marginal revenue product (or some average of that product) of an identifiable
category of workers minus arbitrarily determined (determined independently of market
prices for labor) payment for capital services and raw materials. See Nelson, et al., supra
note 33, at 257.
84. Nelson et al., supra note 33, at 258.
85. Although human capital investment may be viewed as a determinant of supply, it
is possible to estimate the value of work to an employer by utilizing variables identifiable
with human capital investment (e.g., education, training and experience variables) as prox-
ies for productivity. Nelson, et al., supra note 33, at 258. On human capital assumptions,
the market pays workers for their marginal products and workers with the highest invest-
ment in human capital obtain jobs generating higher marginal product. See Darity, supra
note 82, at 79; Sobel, supra note 81, at 256-58. On such premises, wage differentials between
men and women may be explained, utilizing the statistical technique of multiple regression,
in terms of differences in human capital investment: education, experience, training, con-
tinuity of participption in the work force, etc. See e.g. Corcoran, Work Experience, Labor
Force Withdrawals, and Women's Wages: Empirical Results Using the 1976 Panel of In-
come Dynamicsi in WOMEN IN THE LABOR MARKET, supra note 66 at 216; Malkiel & Malkiel,
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second, identifiable with the managerial science of formal job eval-
uation,86 is that the characteristics of work (e.g., the skill, effort,
responsibility and working conditions elements of the Equal Pay
Act's equal work standard), may be identified and rated for the
purpose of comparing the viue of distinct work. Further, these
characteristics may provide the means for relating the compensa-
tion to be paid jobs for which there is no identifiable market rate
to jobs for which there is such a rate."7
supra note 66, at 66; Mincer & Polachek, supra note 64; Sandwell & Shapiro, Work Expec-
tations, Human Capital Accumulation and the Wages of Young Women, 15 J. Human
Resources 333 (1980).
Although it is possible to view the human capital approach as in effect an attempt at fully
explaining male-female compensation differentials on the basis of factors independent of
sex, it is also possible to utilize the techniques developed by the approach to characterize
any residual differential remaining after accounting for differences in human capital invest-
ment as a residual attributable to disparate gender treatment. The accuracy of that infer-
ence is dependent upon the selection of the independent investment variables used in a
regression analysis to explain a dependent (wage) variable and upon the accuracy of the
assumption that such variables are adequate proxies both for true productivity and for a
defendant employer's gender neutral estimate of productivity. See infra notes 199-246 and
accompanying text.
It may also be possible to utilize the approach to conclude that discrimination has oc-
curred on a disparate impact theory. If one assumes a governmental decision that a series of
independent human investment variables must be used by employers in establishing com-
pensation for unequal jobs, the human capital theory might be transformed from a theory
which seeks to explain compensation differentials on the basis of differences in individual
investment decisions to a basis for mandated criteria for making compensation decisions.
See infra notes 213-29 and accompanying text. One means of accomplishing such a transfor-
mation would be simply to impose a business necessity justification requirement on em-
ployer use of a criterion (e.g. occupation) which produces disparate results by gender. Cf.
Strober, Comment in WOMEN IN THE LABOR MARKET, supra note 66, at 275-77 (suggesting
that economists of the human capital persuasion have failed to recognize the legal reality of
disparate impact doctrine). In short, it is possible to establish (arbitrarily) a governmental
definition of "productivity." And such a definition is pro tanto established by a judicial
acceptance of a human capital regression analysis which relies upon a residual as an approx-
imation of disparate treatment where all gender neutral explanatory factors are not taken
into account. See infra notes 230-46 and accompanying text.
86. See Nelson et al., supra note 33, at 257-60 (raising and rejecting this possibility).
Job evaluation systems may be viewed as establishing a means of measuring "worth" by
establishing proxy criteria (e.g. skill and effort required by a particular job) for worth and
productivity. See note 87 infra. Cf. R. TOLLES, supra note 83, at 88 (advocates of scientific
management proposed incentive systems based on studies of job tasks which would establish
wages consistent with marginal worth). Job evaluation nevertheless appears to define value
by focusing upon the nature of job tasks and requirements rather than in terms of produc-
tivity as such.
87. Job evaluation systems utilize market rates for "benchmark" jobs for which there
is a current market rate, current compensation rates or a priori estimates of value as the
definition of value or worth. See WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 71-82; D.
TRIEMAN, JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC VIEw 2-7 (1979) (interim report to EEOC); Schwab,
Job Evaluation and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra
note 17, at 68; Hildebrand, The Market System, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 17, at
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The primary difficulty generated by use of either of the forego-
ing substitutes for the impracticable direct measurement of pro-
ductivity is that the employer subjected to either standard may
not in fact have based its compensation decisions upon the worker
characteristics assumed by the human capital theorist or the evalu-
ative judgments utilized by the formal job evaluator. The employer
may have relied instead upon its perception of or experience with
the market, upon its informal evaluation of the worth of distinct
work or upon its guesses about potential and current
productivity."8
This difficulty is of course not surprising. Pristine versions of
comparable worth theory seek quite candidly to substitute an im-
posed valuation system for the system used in fact by the em-
ployer.89 But the difficulty does suggest something essential to the
nature of the legal doctrine implicit in all versions of comparable
worth theory; that is, the theory is less concerned with identifying
what the employer did in fact than with what employers should do.
Human capital theory, originally postulated as a theory in explana-
tion of an economic phenomenon, is potentially a normative the-
ory. Workers should be compensated in proportion to their invest-
ments.90 Job evaluation, often used for the purpose of discovering
88-93. They then seek to relate other jobs to such measure of value by identifying and rat-
ing, elements of such different jobs (e.g. skill, effort and working conditions) in relation to
identified and rated elements of, e.g., benchmark jobs. In short, the focus is upon the rela-
tive character of jobs. Alternatively, a human capital approach utilizes characteristics of
workers (e.g., experience and education) as proxies for productivity. See supra note 85. The
focus is therefore upon the characteristics of workers rather than the characteristics of work.
Both approaches may be viewed as efforts to make concrete the supposition that compensa-
tion reflects productivity, but the distinct focus employed by the approaches can be ex-
pected to produce distinct estimates of appropriate compensation levels.
88. See Gwartney, Asher, Haworth & Haworth, Statistics, The Law and Title VII: An
Economist's View, 54 NoTn DAME LAW 633, 657 n.68, 658 (1979). Cf. WOMEN, WORK AND
WAGES, supra note 17, at 72 (employers often use job evaluation to identify or "capture"
current but inexplicit compensation policy); Roberts, Statistical Biases In the Measure-
ment of Employment Discrimination in COMPARABLE WoiRH, supra note 17, at 180-90 (dis-
tinguishing assessed from true productivity).
89. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
90. Both approaches are subject to manipulation. In the case of job evaluation, the
subjectivity of evaluation requires judgments about which elements of work should be com-
pensated and the relative weight to be assigned to each element. Such judgments cannot be
objectively made in the absence of an agreement on some starting point for valuation (such
as the market). See WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 82. In the case of human
capital theory, there is a danger that the use of a productivity proxy, thought of merely as
an explanatory variable, will assume a normative aspect. For example, implicit in the use of
"years of education" as an explanatory proxy for productivity in a regression analysis is the
judgment that all years of education (whether in the form of secretarial school or medical
school) are interchangeable. Differences in the "return" on "investment" in years of educa-
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and making explicit an employer's ad hoc and informal compensa-
tion policy, 91 is potentially an instrument for effecting a normative
theory. Workers should be compensated at rates commensurate
with the formally evaluated character of their work.
Comparable worth theory might seek to utilize the characteris-
tics of workers or the characteristics of work as a means of assess-
ing relative value within either the disparate treatment or the dis-
parate impact doctrines. The question asked by disparate
treatment doctrine in this context is whether gender motivated the
compensation decision.2 Gender may be said to have motivated
the compensation decision if the employer compensated work
predominantly performed by females at a lower rate than work
predominantly performed by males because the former was
predominantly performed by females.93 The human capital or job
evaluation techniques for assessing relative value arguably aid in
answering the disparate treatment question if a component of a
compensation differential between segregated jobs cannot be ex-
plained by differences in the human capital characteristics of
workers or differences in the evaluated worth of the segregated
jobs.9 " The disparate gender effect of the employer's compensation
decisions generates an inference of disparate treatment to the ex-
tent that such an effect cannot be attributed to the legitimate con-
siderations postulated by the techniques."
tion may then be thought to be "discriminatory" because rates of return on an identical
investment vary in a manner correlated with gender. (Secretaries are predominantly female
and doctors predominantly male). It is of course possible to argue that investments in edu-
cation should be treated as interchangeable, but the argument is more than an argument
about the availability of data if it is used to impose liability. It is, as well, a normative
argument about fair returns which rejects a normative argument about differences in invest-
ments. See Valentino v. United States Postal Service, 674 F.2d 56, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (re-
jecting a regression study which failed to account for type of education); Milkovich, The
Emerging Debate, supra note 81, at 44.
91. See TRIEMAN, supra note 87, at 4; WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 17, at 72.
92. Illicit motive is crucial to disparate treatment theory. See, e.g. Texas Dept. Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
93. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180-81 (1981).
94. See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l. Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
95. Although disparate consequences raise an inference of illicit motive, Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), such consequences must be of a character
which permits an inference that motive explains the consequences. See International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 358 n.44 (1977); Texas Dept. Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981). The mere fact of job segregation does not,
given the multitude of potential reasons for that segregation, eliminate the most common
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The questions asked by disparate impact doctrine are whether a
gender neutral employment criterion generates a disparate adverse
effect on female workers and whether that effect may be justified
by "business necessity."'e Compensation criteria may be character-
ized as having a disparate effect if female workers within a firm
are, on average, compensated at a lower rate than male workers
within that firm.97 Such a differential is arguably justified by busi-
ness necessity if based upon considerations judicially approved as
furthering legitimate business interests. 8
In theory, disparate treatment and disparate impact are distinct
doctrines."9 As the doctrines have been stated above, they appear
indistinct. Under both, a disparity in compensation not explained
by the human capital characteristics of workers or the formally
evaluated characteristics of jobs (or by a combination of these con-
siderations)100 is unlawful discrimination. There are two reasons
for this apparent absence of distinction. First, the policy function
of the disparate impact doctrine is both in the present context and
generally, incoherent. Second, comparable worth theory is inher-
ently a variation on a disparate impact theme, even where it pur-
ports to prohibit only illicitly motivated employer compensation
decisions.
1. The Policy Functions of Disparate Impact Doctrine
The primary theoretical distinction between the disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact doctrines is that illicit employer motive
is crucial under the former doctrine and immaterial under the lat-
ter doctrine.101 Liability is imposed under disparate impact doc-
trine for inadequately justified disparities in the effect of an em-
ployment criterion upon protected race or gender groups,
nondiscriminatory reasons for disparities in compensation. 431 U.S. at 358.
96. See, e.g., Smith v. Olin Chemical Corp., 555 F.2d 1283, 1286 (5th Cir. 1977).
97. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination and Job Segregation: The Survival of a
Theory, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1980).
98. See Valentino v. United States Postal Service, 674 F.2d 56, 73 n.30 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l. Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 313 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
99. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
100. See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l. Bank of Texas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 284-87 (N.D.
Tex. 1980).
On the question of the disintegration of the distinction between treatment and impact
theories in this context, see generally, D. Gregory, Comparable Worth: The Demise of the
Disparate Impact Theory of Liability, 1982 DET. C. L. REv. 853.
101. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, n.15 (1977).
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regardless of the motivation for adopting the criterion., Although
an employer who adopts a gender neutral criterion which will have
a disparate adverse effect on female workers may be said to have
intended that effect in the sense that the effect was a natural and
probable consequence of the use of the criterion, the employer's
motive for adopting the criterion may have been (and most proba-
bly was) the perceived business interest furthered by the criterion.
Because disparate treatment doctrine requires an illicit motive,10'
an employer's use of a gender neutral criterion would have to be
shown to be pretextual. More specifically, it must be demonstrated
that the employer used the criterion because of rather than de-
spite its effect on female workers to establish liability for disparate
treatment. Disparate impact doctrine would, in theory, impose lia-
bility if the criterion could not be shown to be sufficiently neces-
sary to furthering the employer's business interests.
The threat of exposure to disparate impact doctrine in effect
compels employers to weigh the interests of the gender group
which may be adversely affected by a business decision against the
business gains anticipated.'0" To the extent that the business ne-
cessity defense is more difficult to establish (to the extent that the
necessity rather than the mere reasonableness of a business prac-
tice must be shown), courts applying the theory are engaged in a
similar balancing process. The disparate effect on the protected
group is weighed against the economic costs of foregoing a chal-
lenged practice.10 5 Implicit in such a weighing process is a policy of
102. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
103. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258-59 (1981);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Cf. Givhan v. Western Line ConsoL
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416 (1979) (unconstitutional motivation); Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (unconstitutional motivation).
104. See, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 232 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting) rev'd. sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979);
cf. G. CALABmSi, THs COSTS OF AccIDENsr: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIc ANALysts 68-94 (1970)
(general deterrence).
105. The courts have been inconsistent in applying the business necessity defense.
Compare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (defense not satisfied where em-
ployer has alternative with lesser impact) and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975) (strict application of job relatedness test of validity of employment examinations)
with New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) (criterion satisfies
defense if it "significantly serves" employer's interest); and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) (reasonableness test of business necessity). The lower courts appear more in-
dined to apply the defense strictly. See, e.g., Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677
(8th Cir. 1974); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). But see Spurlock
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
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ensuring equality of results for groups.106 On the hypothesis that
historical discrimination, both in the sense of overt discrimination
and of misallocations of societal resources, is responsible for dis-
parities in the group consequences of current employer actions,1'"
the burden of that discrimination is shifted by the doctrine from
the group to the employer. On the hypothesis that the objective of
equality should be defined as equal achievement for groups,108 the
doctrine effects that objective by precluding practices which gener-
ate unequal results for groups.
There is, however, another and potentially inconsistent policy
underlying the disparate impact doctrine." Although the for-
seeability or inevitability of disparate impact does not establish il-
licit motive, it is possible to infer that illicit motive is at least one
possible explanation of the employer's use of a practice having
such an impact. The viability of that inference is, of course, depen-
dent upon whether probable alternative explanations have been
eliminated. Moreover, the credibility of an employer's assertion
that a gender neutral business practice having a disparate gender
impact furthers some business interest is subject to question if the
interest is poorly served by the practice. If the business necessity
defense requires an employer to establish that its practice is rea-
sonably related to the interest it asserts as the reason for the prac-
tice, 1 0 the defense is a means of assessing the credibility of that
assertion. Consequently, the potentially inconsistent policy under-
lying the disparate impact doctrine is that it provides a means of
reaching a disparate treatment issue. It merely takes account of
the difficulties inherent in discovering motive in the litigation pro-
cess by allocating a greater risk of judicial error to employers in
the form of a burden of justification - a burden satisfied by meet-
ing more or less rigidly defined judicial standards for employment
106. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2536-37 (1982) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, The Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U.
Cm. L. Rav. 775 (1979).
107. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
108. See generally Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CH. L. Rav. 235
(1971).
109. See, e.g., Rothschild & Werden, Title VII and The Use of Employment Tests:
An Illustration of The Limits of the Judicial Process, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 261, 271-79 (1982);
Rutherglenn, Sexual Equality in Fringe Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. Rev. 199, 233 n.144 (1979);
Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate Impact Liability Under Title VII,
46 U. CHI. L. Rav. 911 (1979).
110. See generally Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity,




If this prophylactic policy is assumed as the basis for impact
doctrine, both the impact doctrine and the disparate treatment
doctrine seek to preclude illicitly motivated employer conduct. The
distinction between the doctrines is that disparate impact liability
is overinclusive and disparate treatment liability is underinclu-
sive. 1" 2 While disparate impact doctrine forces employers to adhere
to governmentally defined standards of appropriate employment
practices because deviation from those standards risks disparate
treatment, required adherence is nevertheless an obligation
broader than that of refraining from race or gender motivated ac-
tion. Disparate treatment doctrine forces the plaintiff to establish
that an employer's action was illicitly motivated because imposing
the burden of justification on the employer would constitute gov-
ernment intrusion into legitimate business discretion. However,
imposing the burden of proof on plaintiffs to establish illicit mo-
tive in each case nevertheless risks non-discovery of disparate
treatment in many cases.
If the sole question underlying a choice between disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment doctrines was the question of over or
underinclusive prohibition, the choice would be merely a matter of
judgment, based principally on the decisionmaker's relative dis-
taste for judicial intrusion into business practice or the risk of per-
mitting disparate treatment to continue. There is, however, an-
other question underlying that choice. The first policy basis for the
disparate impact doctrine postulated here, equal achievement for
groups, is as plausible an explanation for the doctrine as an overin-
clusive prohibition of disparate treatment explanation. The two ex-
planations are equally plausible because they run together and the
distinction between them is a matter of degree (largely degree of
the employer's burden of justification).' Disparate impact doc-
111. See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l. Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 264-65, 313
(N.D. Tex. 1980).
112. Compare Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (em-
ployer need only produce evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions
to rebut a prima facie case); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (employer
need only articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its action; it need not adopt criteria
which will have the least adverse effect on minorities) with Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321 (1977) (employer must use less burdensome alternative criterion to satisfy business ne-
cessity defense); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (employer must satisfy
rigid requirement of EEOC guidelines on selection procedures to establish job relatedness of
employment examination).
113. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Burger, C.J., writing the
opinion for the Court) with Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449-53 (1975)
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trine is incoherent because the courts have failed to make explicit
which policy objective takes precedence and to therefore provide a
guideline by which judgments concerning this matter of degree
may be made.1" The second question underlying the choice is
therefore whether the policy of equal achievement, implicit, in de-
gree, in the choice of an impact doctrine, is an acceptable policy in
the context in which the choice is to be made; here, in the context
of compensation. 15
2. Comparable Worth Theory As Disparate Impact Doctrine
It cannot be said that there is a single identifiable legal theory of
"comparable worth." Rather, there are distinct theories which
share common themes. As the comparable worth label implies, one
such common theme is that compensation is to be based upon the
relative value of distinct and unequal work. A second common
theme is that compensation rates established by the market for
work predominantly performed by female workers are tainted by
discrimination. There are three identifiable theories for imple-
menting these themes in the legal process.1 6 It is the thesis here
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
114. The 5-4 split on the Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982)
suggests that there are rather substantial differences of opinion on the Court about the
function of disparate impact doctrine. Moreover, the Court's recent efforts to enforce a
strict and disciplined interpretation of disparate treatment doctrine, Texas Dept. of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), appear superfluous if the scope of operation
of disparate impact doctrine is not confined. The instant an employer articulates a non-
discriminatory reason for its actions in a disparate treatment case, it subjects that reason (if
the reason has a disparate impact on protected groups) to disparate impact attack.
115. See generally Kurland, Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 1.
116. It is possible to identify other arguments as comparable worth arguments which
are outside the scope of the present discussion because they entail calls to action indepen-
dent of theories of legal liability. The most promising of such theories is that economic
power, e.g., the power of unions in the collective bargaining process, can and should be used
to force employers to adopt standards for making compensation decisions which will not
result in disparate gender impact. Cf. Newman & Vonhoff, supra note 8, at 318-19 (advocat-
ing litigation by unions but also arguing that unions may avoid exposure to litigation by
seeking changes through collective bargaining); id. at 321-22 (recounting successful bargain-
ing and strike efforts on part of A.F.S.C.M.E. against the city of San Jose, California); A.
WooD, A THEORY OF PAY 223-39 (1978) (advocating a more sophisticated but essentially
similar approach of forcing employer-employee negotiation over "relatives"--normative be-
liefs about relative fairness of pay). Upon the assumptions that such efforts are directed to
remedying differentials without reliance upon gender as a remedial device, they would not
raise the questions presented by United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). There
are also potential means of employing economic power to achieve comparable worth ends
independently of collective bargaining. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct.
3409 (1982).
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that each such theory is, in operation, a disparate impact theory.
a. Government Evaluation of the Comparable Worth of Unequal
Work
The most obvious comparable worth theory is the notion that
the government should regulate employee compensation by requir-
ing equal pay for work of equal value and pay proportionate to the
relative values of work of unequal value. A direct means of regula-
tion would simply mandate formal job evaluation in compliance
with government standards for such evaluation. 117 A potential indi-
rect means of accomplishing the same end by judicial lawmaking
following Gunther is simply to borrow the proof scheme of dispa-
rate impact doctrine in which the disparate effects of neutral em-
ployment criteria must be justified by "business necessity." In the
present context, employer reliance upon different market rates for
unequal work or upon informal job evaluation is reliance upon
neutral criteria having a disparate effect. 118 That effect must be
justified by reference to some judicially imposed standard of ap-
propriate employment practice, e.g., formal job evaluation or a
combination of job evaluation and differences, as between male
and female workers, in average human capital investment.119 There
117. This means was proposed to and rejected by the congress which enacted the
Equal Pay Act. See supra note 2. For proposals to impose formal job evaluation on employ-
ers, see Gasaway, Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther Overview, 69 GEo. L.J. 1123, 1155-59
(1981); Note, Equal Pay, Comparable Work and Job Evaluation, 90 YALE L.J. 657, 674-80
(1981).
118. Such reliance adversely affects female workers as they disproportionately staff
lower paying jobs. See WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 24-41; Blumrosen,
Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, at 460-61; Newman & Vonhoff, supra note 8, at 289-91.
Such a mandate was apparently the plaintiff's theory in Lemons v. City & County of
Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980). There plaintiff nurses
sought to force the defendant city to abandon a system in which nurse compensation was
determined by reference to the private sector market rate for nurses and to compare instead
city nurses' compensation with the market determined rate for other (male- dominated)
professions. In effect, then, the plaintiff's theory sought to substitute a male-dominated pro-
fessional's market rate criterion for the city's "nurse market rate" criterion as an appropri-
ate measure of the relative contribution of nursing jobs to the city.
119. For reliance upon job evaluation and multiple regression as a basis for inferring a
discrimination component, see WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 82-89. For reli-
ance upon productivity proxies (worker characteristics, e.g. years of education) and multiple
regression as a basis for inferring a discrimination component, see, e.g., id. at 17-24; Oaxaca,
supra note 81. Multiple regression as a statistical tool for identifying disparate treatment is
more fully explored at text and notes 199-246 infra.
Although each approach is framed in terms of contentions that existing devices are
tainted by discrimination or are so subjective as to risk discrimination, neither relies upon
proof in individual cases that an employer has used gender as a reason for its compensation
County of Washington v. Gunther
is a clear precedent for such judicial lawmaking. Employment tests
(and perhaps other employee selection criteria as well) which gen-
erate disparate selection rates by race or gender must be shown to
be job related within the meaning of the rather strict standards of
the industrial psychologists. 0
The rationales for either direct or indirect regulation of compen-
sation are presumably the rationales for the disparate impact doc-
trine. An overinclusive prohibition is necessary if disparate treat-
ment is to be detected and eradicated,12 1  and substantial
disparities in the compensation paid male and female workers as
groups are to be eliminated.12 2 The arguments against regulation,
on the other hand, are arguments against the disparate impact
doctrine. Overinclusive regulation abrogates both business discre-
tion and the market mechanism, and the claim that compensation
diffferentials between male and female workers as groups are ineq-
uitable erroneously assumes that equal results as between gender
groups is a legitimate governmental objective. 123
A theory of direct or indirect regulation of compensation is, how-
ever, merely the most obvious and candid means of adopting a dis-
parate impact approach. Less obvious and less candid comparable
worth theories are equally disparate impact theories.
b. Presumed Discrimination
It has been argued that illegal compensation discrimination
should be presumed from "job segregation. 12 4 Job segregation,
decisions. Both approaches therefore adopt what is in effect a disparate impact theory. Em-
ployer reliance upon facially gender neutral criteria for decision is to be precluded on the
ground that the observed effect of such reliance is a difference in average earnings between
males and females as groups. See WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 13-43, 71-82.
120. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.18
(1978).
121. See WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 77-78 (existing formal job eval-
uation systems are too subjective and therefore permit covert discrimination).
122. See WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 41-42 (evidence of existing pay
inequity); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, 460-61 (wage disparities indicate
"discrimination" where discrimination is defined broadly to apparently mean, somewhat cir-
cularly, wage disparities between jobs segregated de facto).
123. See Nelson et al., supra note 33, at 383-85.
124. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, at 441-57, 459, 468. Cf. New-
man & Vonhoff, supra note 8, at 314-15 (rejecting a market defense to a comparable worth
theory); Gasaway, Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther Overview, 69 GEo. L.J. 1123, 1131,
1155-60 (1981) (noting discriminatory market theory and suggesting job evaluation as legal
tool for evaluating comparable worth claims- a tool which would circumvent the market).
The primary advocate of a presumption analysis is Professor Ruth Blumrosen: "wage dis-
crimination" should be presumed from "job segregation" and the burden should therefore
1983
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 22:65
under this theory, means de facto job segregation so that the mere
fact that some jobs are staffed predominantly by males and some
jobs are staffed predominantly by females warrants a presumption
that a compensation differential between the jobs is illicit.125 Al-
though an employer may rebut this presumption by establishing
that the differential is attributable to "legitimate considerations,"
neither reliance on the "tainted" market rate nor reliance upon in-
evitably subjective employer sponsored job evaluation is a legiti-
mate consideration. 2 ' The chief proponent of this presumption
theory, Professor Ruth Blumrosen, contends that the theory is not
a comparable worth theory because it does not rely upon govern-
ment evaluation of relative worth.2 7 Such a government evaluation
occurs only at a remedy stage under her proposal; liability is a
function of de facto segregation and of the risks of discrimination
inherent in employer reliance upon the market or upon subjective
evaluation.2 8
Two points should be noted concerning the Blumrosen thesis.
fall on the employer to prove that a wage differential between jobs "segregated" by gender
was based on legitimate factors other than sex. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra
note 8, at 441-57, 459, 468. Blumrosen denies that such an analysis is a "comparable worth"
analysis because it does not rely upon any attempt at measuring, by government imposed
standards, the "worth" of comparable jobs. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination and Job Seg-
regation: The Survival of a Theory, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1980). Indeed Blumrosen at-
tacks job evaluation systems as subjective and as therefore themselves tainted by gender
prejudice. Blumrosensupra note 8, at 428-41.
125. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, at 457-65. Although Blum-
rosen characterizes job segregation as establishing a prima facie case, id. at 468, "segrega-
tion" is not defined in Blumrosen's theory as intentional segregation by employers on the
basis of gender. That is only one of a number of possible explanations of job segregation.
See id. at 462; Nelson, et al., supra note 33, at 253-64. Moreover, Blumrosen would appar-
ently require a business necessity defense where a plaintiff proceeds on an impact theory,
Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, at 463, 465, 490, a notion inconsistent with
any requirement that intentional job segregation be established.
The difficulties with the Blumrosen thesis He in her use of the terms "discrimination" and
"segregation". "Discrimination" is a hypothesis derived from the inference Blumrosen
wishes to make from "segregation," and "segregation" means the presence of jobs in an
employment system some of which are disproportionately staffed by males and some of
which are disproportionately staffed by females. "Segregation" does not, in the Blumrosen
analysis, mean proven job assignment motivated by gender. As a consequence of these un-
derstandings of the terms discrimination and segregation, it is not clear whether Blumrosen
is advocating a disparate treatment theory or-a disparate impact theory. See Nelson, et al.,
supra note 33, at 237, 283, 284. Compare Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, at
460 (job segregation established prima facie case of disparate treatment) with Blumrosen,
Survival of a Theory, supra note 124, at 1 (depressed wage rate is an "effect" of job segrega-
tion within the meaning of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
126. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, at 434-41, 466-75.
127. Blumrosen, Survival of a Theory, supra note 124, at 1.
128. Id.
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First, the claim that the theory is not a comparable worth theory is
disingenuous. The supposed distinction between liability and rem-
edy is spurious where liability is presumed from de facto segrega-
tion and the employer is precluded from relying on the chief mech-
anisms for establishing compensation. 29 Second, the theory is, in
essence, a disparate impact theory. 30 In form, the theory may be
characterized as relying upon an inference of illicit motive arising
from a disparity in consequences. It may be inferred that a com-
pensation differential between segregated jobs arises because the
jobs are segregated. That inference is, however, extremely weak.
There are many and obvious alternative and facially gender neu-
tral explanations for such a differential, including distinct market
rates for dissimilar work, differences in average human capital in-
vestment of the workers engaged in dissimilar work, and differ-
ences in the formally or informally valued worth of dissimilar
work. "' Nor can the theory's reliance upon job segregation be said
129. Professor Blumrosen argues that her theory-a theory which presumes discrimi-
nation from de facto job segregation-does not entail a problem of comparison because any
comparison judicially undertaken under that theory occurs at a remedy stage rather than
liability stage of adjudication. Blumrosen, Survival of a Theory, supra note 124, at 3-4. It is
true that a theory which presumes wage discrimination from de facto job segregation is
distinguishable in form from a theory which grounds liability upon an employer's failure to
comply with an externally mandated standard of valuation. It is, however, not distinguisha-
ble in substance for two reasons. First, to the extent that the presumption is rebuttable by
proof of employer "justification," an external standard of justification is, in operative effect,
an externally imposed standard of valuation. See id. at 6-7 (employer should have burden of
establishing "legitimate" reasons independent of sex for a differential once segregation is
shown). If all that need be shown in rebuttal is a gender neutral basis for decision, such an
externally imposed standard amounts in theory to a disparate treatment prohibition despite
an allocation of the burden of proof (presumably a burden of persuasion) to the employer.
In that event, Blumrosen is quite right in distinguishing her theory from "comparable
worth" theory. It is, however, not at all apparent that the "legitimacy" of the employer's
reasons asserted in rebuttal is to be measured by reference to a disparate treatment stan-
dard. Blumrosen's repeated references to impact theory and her refusal to permit employer
reliance on either market rates or employer developed (and facially gender neutral) evalua-
tion systems suggest that in fact an externally imposed "objective" standard of valuation is
mandated by her theory. See id. at 2, 4, 7.
Second, shifting the external standard problem from a liiability to a remedy stage of judi-
cial proceedings, id. at 4, does not establish that no externally developed standard of value
is imposed where liability is presumed from de facto segregation. The presumption, particu-
larly where the presumption is made difficult to rebut, makes the distinction between an
issue of liability and an issue of remedy a matter merely of labels.
130. See Blumrosen, Survival of a Theory, supra note 124, at 1.
131. See Nelson et al., supra note 33, at 244-64. The difficulty with an argument that
reliance upon the market or upon internal evaluation in "job segregation" circumstances
should be treated as reliance on gender is that the factual predicates for such a treatment
are missing. Pregnancy is legitimately treated as synonymous with gender because it is a
biological fact that only females are capable of becoming pregnant. General Electric Co. v.
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to warrant a legitimate inference of disparate treatment. The job
segregation relied upon is not job segregation shown in individual
cases to be the product of gender based job assignments. It is,
rather, de facto job segregation which is as explicable by reference
to differences in job application and human capital investment de-
cisions of male and female workers as to conduct on the part of
employers2lag
Moreover, Professor Blumrosen's rejection both of formal and
informal job evaluation and of market rates as legitimate employer
defenses renders her theory a disparate impact theory. The market
is rejected on a taint hypothesis, but, as was previously argued
here, that hypothesis relies as much upon the notion that past so-
cietal discrimination has affected the decisions of female workers
as it does upon the unproven notion that there are frequent occur-
rences of job assignment discrimination by employers. 83 The pre-
sumption theory, therefore, rejects the market because of its dispa-
rate effect, not because employer reliance on the market
constitutes illicit motivation. Job evaluation is rejected by Profes-
sor Blumrosen not because gender is shown in a particular case to
have been included in the evaluation, but because the subjective
character of even formal job evaluation risks disparate treat-
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). A longevity criterion is legiti-
mately treated as synonymous with a gender criterion where there has been a factual finding
that longevity was calculated by reference to gender. See City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 712-13 (1978). Reliance upon the market is not factually
reliance on gender unless it can be established that the market relies upon gender. There is
a theory that gender has tainted the market, but that theory relies largely on the proposi-
tions that historical (and non-remediable) discrimination in hiring and self-selection by fe-
males both in making human capital investment decisions and in making job choices has
distorted supply and demand. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, at 445-
54. To the extent that the theory relies on current hiring and assignment discrimination on
the part of employers, discrimination prohibited by Title VII, the extent to which such dis-
crimination, in fact, affects labor market rates is uncertain.
Whether historical conditions and female self-selection should be viewed as sufficient to
warrant the conclusion that the market is synonymous with gender is a policy judgment
which must take into account the fact that such a judgment would result in a radical reor-
dering of the American economy. See Nelson, et al., supra note 33, at 288-97. That policy
judgment is best addressed by Congress. Cf. Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abro-
gation of the Anti Discrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CH. L. REv. 423, 457-59
(1980) (making a similar argument favoring reference to Congress with respect to "volun-
tary" affirmative action). A conclusion that reliance on job evaluation should be treated as
reliance on gender rests on a similarly speculative factual foundation. It is the "risk" of
disparate treatment inherent in subjective judgment rather than the occurrence of disparate
treatment which is the ground for the conclusion. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination,
supra note 8, at 434-41.
132. Nelson et al., supra note 33, at 239.
133. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
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ment.'M The presumption theory, therefore, rejects job evaluation
from a perceived need for an overinclusive prohibition which will
catch in its net otherwise undetected disparate treatment. In short,
the primary and gender neutral grounds for rebutting the inference
of discrimination presumed from de facto segregation are rejected
either because they are outweighed by the adverse consequences of
their use or because the possibility of undetected employer manip-
ulation is thought to be too great. These reasons for rejection are
also central to disparate impact doctrine.
Adoption of the presumption theory would have consequences
equally congruous with disparate impact doctrine. The proposed
remedy for discrimination presumed from de facto job segregation
is an increased compensation rate paid for jobs predominantly
134. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, at 434-41. Upon the assump-
tion that both the market and internal job evaluation systems are gender neutral, those
systems have a disparate impact upon jobs disproportionately staffed by women because
they operate to perpetuate past (and often non-remediable) hiring discrimination and be-
cause female self-selection in making human capital investment decisions and job selection
decisions operates to depress wage rates in such jobs. The employer "rebuttal" contem-
plated by Professor Blumrosen becomes, in effect, a business necessity defense. The em-
ployer's compensation decision must be shown to be "job related" in the sense that it is
based upon differences in the worth or productivity of different jobs. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Compare Nelson, et al., supra note 33 at 280 (Blumrosen's
presumptions in effect irrebuttable) with Blumrosen, Survival of a Theory, supra note 124,
at 6 (presumption is not irrebuttable).
The disparate impact interpretation of the Blumrosen thesis explains the primary points
of difference between Blumrosen's own view of her theory in Survival of a Theory and the
Nelson, Opton and Wilson critique of that theory. Nelson, et al. complain that there is no
available means by which to determine what, if any, portion of a compensation differential
is attributable to gender. Nelson, et al., supra note 33, at 253-60. Blumrosen argues that
such an issue is a matter of calculating a remedy. Blumrosen, Survival of a Theory, supra
note 124, at 4-5. The former complaint assumes that disparate treatment is the appropriate
conceptual scheme for analysis. The issue is what, if any, part of a compensation differential
is attributable to gender. Because that question cannot be answered except by reference to a
disparate impact methodology (the methodology of imposing government standards on em-
ployer decision-making in place of an inquiry into motivation) it is, for Nelson, Opton and
Wilson, an improper inquiry. The Blumrosen response assumes that disparate impact is the
appropriate scheme for analysis because it assumes liability from effect without reference to
whether any component of a differential- is attributable to gender. The gender component is
presumed from disparate staffing patterns in combination with employer reliance on pre-
sumptively tainted compensation criteria. See Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435,
445 (W.D. Wis. 1982). The effect of accepting such a presumption is to encourage employers
to equalize compensation without reference to their perceptions of productivity. (A rebuttal
burden, whether or not Blumrosen's presumption is irrebuttable, entails substantial ex-
pense). The presumption therefore accomplishes at least one of the potential objectives un-
derlying the disparate impact model; i.e., equal attainment for groups. See generally Fiss,
supra note 108. Blumrosen's theory is on these premises a comparable worth theory. Gov-
ernment policy regarding the appropriate distribution of societal resources is substituted for
employer decisions regarding comparative productivity of different jobs.
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staffed by females. The new rate is to be set as a percentage of the
rate paid for jobs predominantly staffed by males and presumably
one justified by "legitimate" considerations, i.e., those approved by
a court. 185 In short, female workers as a group are to be granted a
right to an increased share of the compensation currently enjoyed
by male workers as a group on the ground that female workers are
presently receiving an inadequate share of the compensation pie.
c. Disparate Impact in Disparate Treatment Clothing: The Via-
bility of An Inference of Illicit Motive From Proof of an Unex-
plained Differential
As previously indicated here, 186 a plaintiff might seek to utilize
job evaluation or human capital productivity proxies within the
framework of a disparate treatment theory. If it can be established
(for example, by means of a job evaluation analysis or by means of
an analysis of productivity or by means of a combination of these
analyses) that a compensation differential between unequal male
and female jobs within a single firm has both a value component
18' 7
and an unexplained component 88 an inference of disparate treat-
ment arises. The unexplained component is potentially attributa-
ble to gender. There are two difficulties with this argument. The
first is that the inference of disparate treatment is dependent upon
the reliability of the technique used to predict the value compo-
nent of the differential. It therefore suffers from defects in the reli-
ability of the technique and from the absence of an uncontroversial
understanding of value. The second difficulty is that the unex-
plained component of the differential is potentially attributable to
considerations distinct from illicit motive and not accounted for in
the analysis of the characteristics of work and productivity of
135. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 8, at 420-21, 460-65.
136. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
137. By value component, I mean that the differential is explained, in part, by a differ-
ence in either the value of the employee's work or the economic value of the contribution
made by the employee to the employer. Notice that, to the extent that the employer has not
based its compensation criteria explicitly on some measure of the value of work or economic
contribution, the value component is in fact a component measured by externally imposed
standards of value.
138. By unexplained component, I mean that portion of a differential not attributable
to the difference in value predicted by the technique (scheme for measuring value of work or
economic contribution of workers) used. For example, differences in return on human capi-
tal investment between male and female workers where investment has been held constant
is an unexplained differential. See WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 17, at 18-19, 40-43;
see infra notes 230 and 233.
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workers. 139
To the extent that the technique employed fails to account for
all explicit or implicit causes of actual compensation rates, it will
attribute the influence of such missing and gender neutral vari-
ables to illicit motivation. 40 To the extent that any technique not
voluntarily adopted by an employer is judicially imposed for pur-
poses of identifying a gender component of a wage differential, the
definition of value underlying the technique is in degree imposed
on the employer. The unexplained component of the differential is
unexplained only in the sense that the valuation assumptions of
the human capital or job evaluation technique utilized do not ex-
plain the component. This difficulty would be obviated merely by
permitting employer rebuttal once the inference derived from the
unexplained component arises were it not for a more fundamental
version of the difficulty. Unless the employer has itself conducted a
job evaluation or human capital productivity study and has chosen
to pay an "unexplained" component of the differential,1 41 it is not
more probable than not that the unexplained differential repre-
sents illicit motive. Absent that circumstance, it is as probable that
the unexplained component of the differential represents the em-
ployer's bad guess concerning value, a guess which is "bad" only in
the sense that it failed to conform to the assumptions of the plain-
tiff's job evaluation or productivity study.
If employer rebuttal is not permitted, judicial reliance upon un-
explained components of a compensation differential to infer dis-
parate treatment would impose a disparate impact theory. Such a
reliance imposes a disparate impact theory because it finds unlaw-
ful a disparate effect of the employer's actions not explained by
the gender neutral considerations proposed by a plaintiff and im-
plicitly approved by a court as legitimate measures of differences
in the value of work. Employer rebuttal (in the form of a proposal
that additional gender neutral considerations explain the compo-
nent of a differential unexplained by the plaintiff's analysis) might
be precluded either because such additional considerations are
thought to risk disparate treatment or because employer reliance
on such additional considerations is thought unwarranted by the
139. See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); Vuyanich v. Republic
Nat'l. Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 284-85 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
140. See, e.g., WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 17, at 19; Milkovich, supra note
81, at 40-42; Chiplin, supra note 66, at 254-58.
141. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); Vuyanich v. Republic
Nat'l. Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 284 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
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employer's business interests. Such judicial reasoning is central to
disparate impact doctrine, as well.
These difficulties are in degree eliminated where the statistical
procedure relied upon by this version of comparable worth theory,
multiple regression, includes as an explanatory variable, the gender
status of employees. In that event, judicial reliance is placed on the
influence on compensation attributed by the procedure to gender
rather than upon the inference of illicit motive arising from a gross
unexplained component of a differential. But even this step poten-
tially imposes a disparate impact theory. To the extent, for exam-
ple, that gender neutral considerations correlated with gender (job
differences are correlated with gender where jobs are segregated de
facto) are omitted from such an analysis, the procedure will attri-
bute the influence on compensation of the omitted consideration to
the gender status variable. 42 This and other difficulties with post-
Gunther reliance upon multiple regression as a means of detecting
142. The addition of a dummy variable for gender to a regression equation permits an
estimation of the average compensation difference between gender groups where gender
neutral influences on compensation selected by the researcher are held constant. See Fisher,
Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 722-24 (1980). Omission
of a variable which influences compensation will bias that estimate if the omitted variable is
correlated with gender. BALDUS & COLE, supra note 51, at 273. Moreover, the imperfect
character of the gender neutral variables selected by the researcher as measures of produc-
tivity or merit (years of education as an explanatory variable may be only imperfectly re-
lated both to true productivity and to the employer's good faith guess regarding productiv-
ity) will result in a similar bias. See COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 17 at 183-92;
Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Dis-
crimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 737, 747-49 (1980).
To the extent that an employer may be required to disprove discrimination by establish-
ing both that omitted variables reduce or eliminate an estimate of an average compensation
difference between gender groups and that the omitted variables are reasonable or necessary
considerations in making compensation decisions, a form of business necessity defense is
imposed on the employer. For example, WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 17, at 85-86,
85 n.8 advocates use of "percent female" as an independent variable in a regression equation
used to derive factor weights for job evaluation, but further contends that employers should
have the burden both of rebutting the "percent female" influence on compensation esti-
mated by the equation and of establishing that alternative factors not accounted for as inde-
pendent variables in the equation are reflected in the residual and should have been
considered.
To the extent that an employer has specified its criteria for decision and to the extent
that the criteria selected are quantifiable, it is of course possible to measure whether the
employer has applied the criteria consistently as between male and female employees. It is
however often the case that employers have not specified their criteria for making compen-
sation decisions. Rather, they make guesses regarding the productivity or estimated produc-
tivity of employees. See, Gwartney, et al., supra note 88, at 657 n.68, 658. Cf. WOMEN, WORK
& WAGES, supra note 17, at 72 (employers often use job evaluation to identify or "capture"
current wage policy); Roberts, Statistical Biases, supra note 88, at 180-90.
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disparate treatment are explored at a later point in this article.43
It is important for present purposes to recognize, however, that re-
liance either upon an unexplained component of a differential or
upon a regression analysis which omits gender neutral considera-
tions correlated with gender risks a legal prohibition distinct in
scope and character from a prohibition of disparate treatment.
B. The Policy Basis For the Equal Work Standard and its
Relationship To Comparable Worth As A Theory
The equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act is inexplicable
from the normative premises of a disparate treatment prohibition.
Although unequal pay for equal work raises a strong inference of
disparate treatment, the equal work standard permits explicit gen-
der based decision whenever jobs are unequal. " The equal work
standard must therefore be explained in terms of competing values
which are independent of the logic of a disparate treatment
prohibition.
The legislative history of the Equal Pay Act discloses three such
independent and competing values. First, the analytical tools nec-
essary for an independent evaluation of issues of comparative com-
pensation were thought to be unavailable. Employer use of the
tools available was authorized by Congress within the rubric of the
equal work standard as a means of permitting maximum flexibility
to employers, but it was made clear that government was not to
impose job evaluation except as a means of determining the
equivalency, rather than comparability, of work. 145 Second, Con-
gress wished to preclude judicial and administrative intrusion into
the exercise of business discretion. Although Congress clearly
wished as well to preclude disparate treatment,'" the inadequacy
of analytic tools for making compensation comparisons rendered it
impossible to confine government inquiry on the basis of such tools
to disparate treatment issues. It therefore adopted the equal work
standard for the explicit purpose of limiting the discretion of en-
143. See infra text accompanying notes 197-246.
144. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 179 & n.19 (1981).
145. See Hearings on H.R. 3861 and Related Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on
Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1963). See
also Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 199-201 (1974).
146. Even advocates of the application of disparate impact theory under the Equal
Pay Act concede that the congressional understanding of the discriminatory evil targeted by
the Act was disparate treatment. See SuLvAN, ZIMMER & RiCHARDS supra note 10, at 624.
But see id. at 618.
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forcement agencies. 47 Third, Congress sought to preclude judicial
circumvention of the market and of industrial practice unrelated to
the practice of gender motivated decision because it viewed the ad-
judication process as an inadequate means for making the judg-
ments which would be required by abrogation of the market and of
industry practice. 48
In sum, then, Congress explicitly rejected comparable worth pro-
posals because it both doubted the viability of comparable worth
as a manageable construct and wished to preclude government in-
trusion into private compensation decisions except where such an
intrusion could be undertaken for the purpose of discovering and
prohibiting disparate treatment and could be narrowly confined to
that purpose. Indeed, these considerations were viewed as of suffi-
cient importance to cause Congress to compromise the objective of
prohibiting disparate treatment and to therefore risk the occur-
rence of disparate treatment by enacting the equal work standard.
Despite this recitation of the purposes underlying the equal
work standard and the importance of that standard to the Con-
gress which enacted the Equal Pay Act, it is not apparent that all
potential theories of compensation discrimination which fail to as-
sume as a premise the equality of work, give rise to the evils Con-
gress sought to avoid by the equal work standard. It is of course
apparent that Congress intended the equal work standard as a pro-
phylactic. The regulatory evils at which the standard was targeted
were not to be risked in litigation under the Equal Pay Act."" It is
147. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 186-88 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). The original bill introduced by the Kennedy administration in 1962 utilized
a comparable worth standard to be enforced by means of job evaluation techniques. See
Hearings on H.R. 8898, H.R. 10226 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1962) (testimony of Secretary of
Labor Arthur Goldberg). The bill was amended on the floor of the House on the ground that
the Labor Department should not be the arbiter of the meaning of comparability or value.
108 CONG. REC. 14767 (1962) (Rep. St. George); Id. at 14768 (Rep. Landrum). These objec-
tions to comparable worth were the basis for the equal work standard of the bill introduced
in 1963 which became the Equal Pay Act. See 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963) (Rep. Goodell, co-
sponsor of the bill); 109 CONG. REc. 9195-96 (Rep. Frelinghuysen). -
148. [The intent is to provide] a maximum area for interplay of intangible factors
that justify a measurement which does not have to be given a point-by-point evalua-
tion. In this concept, we want the private enterprise system, employer and employees
and a union, if there is a union, and the employer and employees if there is not a
union, to have a maximum degree of discretion in working out the evaluation of the
employee's work and how much he should pay for it.
109 CONG. REC. 9198 (Rep. Goodell). See also 109 CONG. REc. 9196 (Rep. Frelinghuysen).
149. See 109 CONG. REc. 9196 (Rep. Frelinghuysen); 109 CONG. REC. 9208 (Rep. Good-
ell); Id. at 9209.
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nevertheless possible to postulate claims of disparate gender treat-
ment in compensation decisions which would not be objectionable
from the policy premises underlying the equal work standard.
It is possible to postulate such claims because the policy prem-
ises underlying the equal work standard are premises concerning
the character of the evidence which might be used to establish dis-
parate treatment. Comparisons of worth or value as a means of
proof were rejected by Congress because such a means risked over-
inclusive prohibition. Comparison threatened to substitute govern-
ment developed standards of compensation for a narrow prohibi-
tion of disparate treatment. That threat was a risk inherent in
comparisons of value or worth because, although such comparisons
may generate an inference of disparate treatment, reliance upon
them as a means of approximating a disparate treatment prohibi-
tion too easily becomes in the litigation process a substitution of
government judgment for business judgment.
It should be apparent that each of the versions of comparable
worth theory postulated here suffers from the evidentiary evils
targeted by the equal work standard. To the extent that any such
theory proposes a substitution'" of any job evaluation or produc-
tivity analysis for an employer's existing decisionmaking process, it
constitutes precisely the regulatory evil targeted by the equal work
standard. To the extent that any such theory proposes that dis-
crimination be presumed from reliance upon the market or upon
the assumed occurrence of disparate treatment in hiring or assign-
ment decisions, it indirectly contravenes the policies underlying
the equal work standard by proposing what is, in effect, a disparate
impact theory and by necessitating government imposed compen-
sation standards as a remedial device. Reliance upon unexplained
components of a compensation differential discovered by means of
independent job evaluation or human capital valuation similarly
risks imposition of a disparate impact prohibition.
A disparate impact theory is inconsistent with the policies un-
derlying the equal work standard because it is, by definition, a the-
ory precluding unjustified use of gender neutral criteria for deci-
sion and because justification requires reference to an externally
imposed standard for assessing justification.151 Any presumption of
150. Note, again, that such a substitution could occur either by means of a directly
mandated adherence to an externally developed standard for the determination of compen-
sation or by means of the subterfuge of imposing a justificatory burden on an employer to
be met by reference to an externally imposed standard.
151. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
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discrimination in compensation necessitating an adjustment to
compensation rates as a remedy for that discrimination requires
reference to a judicially imposed standard, an arbitrarily imposed
standard, for measuring an appropriate level of comparative
compensation."2
Assume, however, the paradigm case of an instance in which evi-
dence of comparability and, therefore, an externally imposed stan-
dard of comparison, need not be considered to reach a disparate
treatment finding. The employer admits that it would compensate
at a higher rate if a job predominantly staffed by females was
predominantly staffed by males. The Equal Pay Act's prophylactic
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
152. It has been held that back pay as a remedy for an Equal Pay Act violation is to
be calculated by determining the sum a plaintiff (female) would have received "but for" the
employer's reliance on gender rather than by determining the difference between the plain-
tiff's compensation and the compensation paid males holding substantially equal jobs.
EEOC v. Whitin Machine Works, 635 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir. 1980); Brennan v. Victoria Bank &
Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974). Such a holding is, at least facially, internally incon-
sistent. The finding of liability assumes that a factor other than sex (e.g., experience) is not
the basis for a compensation differential, but that same factor (e.g., experience) may be used
to discount the plaintiff's recovery where the plaintiff lacks the factor or possesses the factor
in lesser degree than a male doing equal work (e.g., the plaintiff has less experience than the
male). If the court concludes that a factor "other than sex" was the basis for the differential,
a conclusion implicit in the proposition that such a factor should govern the remedy issue,
there should be no liability. EEOC v. Whitin Machine Works, 635 F.2d 1095, 1101 (4th Cir.
1980) (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting). If the court concludes that the differential
was based on sex (the defendant failed to establish an affirmative defense), a remedy which
takes into account a "factor other than sex" amounts to an imposition of a comparable
worth standard. Consequently, the employer's compensation system is restructured to re-
flect the court's view of an appropriate valuation of that factor. See id. at 1100 (Winter, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
A solution to this dilemma is, of course, the theory that a component of the differential is
attributable to gender (that component being sufficient to preclude a successful affirmative
defense) and a second component of the differential is attributable to a gender-neutral fac-
tor (e.g., experience). Compensation is a continuous outcome, unlike a hiring decision in-
volving a dichotomous outcome. See D. BALVDS & J. COLE, supra note 51, at 12. It is there-
fore arguably subject to analysis distinct from the "but for" causation test applicable to a
hiring decision. While portions of a continuous outcome are at least arguably attributable to
independent causes, it is not possible to divide a dichotomous outcome into components.
The difficulty with this solution to the dilemma is that the court has no basis for measur-
ing the components of a differential absent proof of an employer's actual use of a gender
neutral criterion and proof of that criterion's actual influence on compensation. If, however,
the actual influence of an experience variable upon a compensation variable is determinable
from evidence of the employer's actual reliance upon experience in establishing male com-
pensation, it is presumably possible to utilize such evidence to calculate a hypothetical ex-
perience component of the male-female differential and to make a back pay award on the
basis of that hypothesis. See Finkelstein, supra note 142, at 751-53; Note, Multiple Regres-
sion Analysis: A Statistical Approach to Assessing and Correcting Salary Inequity, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REV. 449.
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equal work standard might well preclude a remedy in such a case
absent substantially equal jobs staffed by males in the employer's
"establishment.' 153 But preclusion in such a case would be a func-
tion of the prophylactic character of the equal work requirement
rather than the policies underlying that requirement, and a finding
of disparate treatment may be made without reference to an exter-
nally imposed standard of value. The question, indeed the question
raised by Gunther, is whether the Bennett Amendment to Title
VII requires a prophylactic result under Title VII.
III. GUNTHER: A PROPOSED INTERPRETATON
A. The Decision: The Court Giveth and The Court Taketh
Away
In County of Washington v. Gunther,'" a county jail employed
women as guards in the female section of the jail and men as
guards in the male section of the jail. The male guards were paid
higher wages than the female guards, but female guard work was
found not substantially equal to male guard work. The differential
was nevertheless attacked under Title VII on the theory that a
portion of the differential was attributable to intentional gender
discrimination. The question presented was therefore whether the
Bennett Amendment precluded the Title VII claim.
The majority opinion in Gunther narrowly construed the Ben-
nett Amendment by concluding that it incorporated only the
Equal Pay Act's four affirmative defenses into Title VII. 5 The
principal effect of this interpretation is to eliminate the Equal Pay
Act's equal work standard as an element of a compensation dis-
crimination claim brought under Title VII. As Justice Rehnquist
argued in dissent, this interpretation abrogates the congressional
rationale for the Bennett Amendment. The Congress which en-
acted Title VII sought to avoid by the amendment the repeal of
the statutory policies it had adopted a year earlier; principally, the
equal work standard."6'
153. Compare County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 179 n.19 (1981) (adher-
ence to the equal work standard under Title VII "would leave remediless all victims of
discrimination who hold jobs never held by men") with id. at 201 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(overt discrimination is subject to attack under the Equal Pay Act through proof that a
male once holding a plaintiff female's job was compensated at a higher rate or through an
employer concession that he would pay more if a "female" job was occupied by a male).
154. 452 U.S. 161 (1982).
155. Id. at 168.
156. 452 U.S. at 193 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority's response to this point,
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The fact remains, however, that Gunther is now the law. The
present question is Gunther's meaning, and that question is, as an
initial matter, informed by a rationale which seeks to legitimate
the Court's decision on the basis of a premise that the Court's task
in Gunther was statutory interpretation. Such a rationale is sug-
gested by the earlier discussion here of the policy bases for Equal
Pay Act's equal work standard. 157 That standard was characterized
as prophylactic for Equal Pay Act purposes. Its function was to
preclude any judicial or administrative attempt at inquiry into is-
sues of comparative value in the guise of disparate treatment the-
ory. Title VII is, however, a different statute. It is true that Title
VII's prohibition of gender discrimination was largely a congres-
sional afterthought not extensively considered by a Congress con-
cerned primarily with racial discrimination. 15 8 It is equally true
that the Bennett Amendment sought to incorporate Equal Pay Act
policy into Title VII for purposes of the later statute's prohibition
of gender discrimination in compensation. But the general policy
underlying Title VII's prohibition of gender discrimination, a pol-
icy at least inferentially similar to the policy underlying Title VII's
prohibition of racial discrimination, was much broader than the
policy which underlay the Equal Pay Act. Disparate treatment was
viewed for Title VII purposes as an unmitigated evil to be
eliminated. 159
On these premises, Gunther may be viewed as a judicial attempt
at reconciling Title VII's underlying broader view of the evil to be
eradicated with the policy limitations which concerned the Con-
gress which enacted the Equal Pay Act and the Congress which
sought to preserve those limitations in Title VII. Gunther is appro-
priately characterized as a legitimate exercise in statutory con-
struction to the extent that its reconciliation preserves the sub-
stance of the Equal Pay Act policies Congress sought to preserve
by means of the Bennett Amendment.
That the Gunther Court sought such a reconciliation is sug-
that no senator mentioned the equal work standard in the debate on the Bennett Amend-
ment, assumes its conclusion. Id. at 174 n.13. The inquiry, because senatorial statements
were not explicit, was what was meant by the Amendment's incorporation of the Equal Pay
Act.
157. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
158. See Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.
1975).
159. See generally Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added
Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for The Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DuQ. L.
REV. 453 (1981).
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gested by its insistence that the sole issue before it was a claim of
"intentional discrimination" to be established by "direct evi-
dence." 160 The reconciliation itself took the form, however, of the
rationale the Court employed in countering an employer argument
regarding the Court's narrow construction of the scope of the Ben-
nett Amendment. The employer argued that an interpretation in-
corporating only the Equal Pay Act defenses would render the
Bennett Amendment superfluous because those defenses are also
defenses to Title VII's prohibitions. The Court's response to this
argument was as follows:
Incorporation of the fourth affirmative defense could have significant conse-
quences for Title VII litigation. Title VII's prohibition of discriminatory
employment practices was intended to be broadly inclusive, proscribing 'not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation.' The structure of Title VII litigation, including
presumptions, burdens of proof, and defenses, has been designed to reflect
this approach. The fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act, how-
ever, was designed differently, to confine the application of the Act to wage
differentials attributable to sex discrimination. Equal Pay Act litigation,
therefore, has been structured to permit employers to defend against
charges of discrimination where their pay differentials are based on a bona
fide use of 'other faciors other than sex.' Under the Equal Pay Act, the
courts and administrative agencies are not permitted 'to substitute their
judgment for the judgment of the employer. . . who [has] established and
employed a bona fide job rating system,' so long as it does not discriminate
on the basis of sex.'
The Court's reference to Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 6" and its ar-
gument that the Equal Pay Act's fourth affirmative defense, "any
other factor other than sex," was designed to preclude substitution
of judicial judgment for business judgment and was a clear rejec-
tion of disparate impact theory as an available alternative for liti-
gating claims of gender based discrimination in compensation.
63 It
160. 452 U.S. at 166.
161. 452 U.S. at 170-71 (quoting 109 CONG. Rac. 9209) (1963) (statement of Rep.
Goodall) (citations omitted).
162. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs announced disparate impact as a theory of Title VII
liability.
163. Gould, supra note 11, at 466. Cf. B. SCHL1 & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION LAW, 479 & n.149 (2d ed. 1983) (fourth affirmative defense recognized in Gun-
ther is broader than business necessity defense). But see Barnett, Comparable Worth and
The Equal Pay Act- Proving Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Claims After County of
Washington v. Gunther, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1669, 1693 (1982); Newman & Vonhoff, supra
note 8, at 289-91; Note, Proving Title VII Sex-Based Wage Discrimination After County of
Washington v. Gunther, 4 CARwozo L. REV. 281, 314-15 (1982); Note, Sex-Based Wage Dis-
crimination Under the Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1083 (1982).
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is, moreover, a rejection not subject to circumvention by means of
an argument that an issue of disparate impact was not before the
Court in Gunther. It may be legitimately argued that the Court's
references to the intentional discrimination claim at issue in Gun-
ther and to the plaintiffs anticipated use of "direct evidence"
merely reserved the question of comparable worth theory for the
future."" But the Court's rationale for its claim that the Equal Pay
Act's fourth affirmative defense makes a difference for Title VII
purposes is the central thread in its interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment. Any future approval of disparate impact theory for
purposes of attacking compensation decisions necessarily severs
that thread and renders Gunther an instance of judicial repeal of
an express legislative command. Such an approval would read the
Bennett Amendment out of the statute.
On the assumption, then, that Gunther permits Title VII attacks
on gender related compensation decisions only by means of dispa-
rate treatment theory, the Court's abrogation of the equal work
standard was only a partial abrogation. Although abrogation of
that standard opened the door to comparable worth theory, an in-
sistence on disparate treatment very nearly closes that door. And
both the opening and closing may be said to operate as the legiti-
mate reconciliation earlier postulated here.1" To the extent that a
disciplined application of a disparate treatment theory precludes
the forms of judicial inquiry the Equal Pay Act Congress sought to
preclude by means of an equal work standard, the substance of the
congressional policy expressed by that standard is preserved. At
the same time, the broader view of the prohibition of discrimina-
tion implicit in Title VII, is given effect."6 It is true that when
Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act it sought a prophylactic stan-
dard and that Gunther defeats prophylaxis, but whether that de-
feat will result in the evils Congress sought to preclude by prophy-
laxis is dependent upon the discipline with which post-Gunther
judicial decisions adhere to disparate treatment as governing
conception.
164. See Newman & Vonhoff, supra note 8, at 282.
165. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
166. This broader view was discussed in Gunther as follows: "In practical terms, [the
employer's argument] means that a woman who is discriminatorily underpaid could obtain
no relief-no matter how egregious the discrimination might be-unless her employer also
employed a man in an equal job in the same establishment, at a higher rate of pay." 452
U.S. at 178.
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B. Post-Gunther Application of Disparate Treatment As
Governing Conception
At its base, a disparate treatment prohibition is a prohibition of
employer action motivated by an illicit basis for decision; in the
present context, by gender. It is not a prohibition merely of unwar-
ranted, undesirable, or immoral intent or purpose, but of gender
caused decision. 6 7 There may be justifications for the use of gen-
der as a basis for decision, but these justifications take the form of
defenses to the application of the prohibition;' 8 they do not alter
the character of the concept underlying the prohibition. It is at the
same time apparent that a disparate treatment prohibition is not a
prohibition of consequences or even of foreseeable, probable, or in-
evitable consequences. Illicit motive is not a legal construct synon-
ymous with intent as it is understood, for example, in the law of
tort.
169
The difficulty presented by disparate treatment as a concept is
that the limitations of the adjudicatory process require, in the ab-
sence of an employer admission, that a plaintiff be permitted to
establish disparate treatment by inference. 7 0 The consequences of
employer actions themselves give rise to inferences about the mo-
tive for such actions. An employer decision which results in signifi-
167. See City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (bona fide occupational qualification). Courts
have on occasion sought to define gender based classifications as gender neutral classifica-
tions. See, e.g. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of pregnant
persons from employment benefits not disparate treatment); De Santis v. Pacific Telephone
& Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (discrimination on the basis of sexual prefer-
ence is not gender discrimination). It is nevertheless apparent that such cases in fact do
entail disparate gender treatment. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Judicial decisions in such contexts are expli-
cable on the grounds either that competing social values outweigh the usual prohibition of
disparate treatment (e.g. social taboos regarding homosexuality outweigh the application of
the prohibition in cases in which an employer decides on the basis of an employee's sexual
preference) or that a court is operating upon an equal achievement (equality of result) pre-
mise rather than an equal treatment (prohibition of disparate treatment) premise. With
respect to the latter point, See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (no
prohibited discrimination where women as a group receive benefits equal to those received
by men as a group); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 456-64 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(there is no disparate impact liability where a racial minority is proportionately represented
in a workforce). But see Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978) (gender caused decision is prohibited as disparate treatment even where consequence
of ignoring gender in making employment decisions will be unequal benefits for males and
females as groups).
169. See Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Cf. Personnel Administra-
tor v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (meaning of illicit motive for equal protection purposes).
170. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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cantly lower compensation for female employees than for male em-
ployees gives rise to an inference that the decision was gender
based. Reliance upon inference results, however, in merely an ap-
proximation of the disparate treatment concept; absent express or
admitted gender based compensation standards, there is always a
risk that disparate treatment will be found where it did not in fact
occur.
A reliance upon consequences as evidence of illicit motive
presents the clearest example of such a risk. An uncritical reliance
on consequences risks a prohibition of consequences even where
the judicial effort is to prohibit illicit motive. 17 1 A disparate impact
theory may be viewed as the full realization of such a risk. Such a
theory prohibits disparate consequences unless those consequences
are justified by "business necessity." "Necessity" entails the sub-
stitution of judicial judgment for employer judgment concerning




The risk run by the Gunther decision's substitution of disparate
treatment for equal work as the means by which the congressional
policies underlying the equal work standard and the Bennett
Amendment are satisfied is the risk that the limitations of the ad-
judicative process will permit an approximation of the disparate
treatment concept which substitutes judicial judgment for em-
ployer judgment untainted by gender considerations. If the "any
other factor other than sex" defense incorporated by the Court's
interpretation of the Bennett Amendment is an affirmative defense
for Title VII purposes, that risk is exacerbated.17 3 What follows are
analyses of each of six postulated schemes of proof of post-Gun-
ther compensation discrimination claims which seek to assess that
risk and to therefore suggest which modes of proof are consistent
with the proposed rationale for Gunther.
171. See Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco Con-
str. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
172. Compare Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972) (subjective
evaluations for promotion found unlawful under disparate impact theory due to risk of dis-
parate treatment) with Nath v. General Electric Co., 438 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (sub-
jective evaluations for professional employees upheld because evaluation is necessarily and
inevitably subjective), aff'd, 594 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1979).
173. See infra notes 272-83 and accompanying text.
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1. Independent Evaluative Evidence of the Relative Value of
Work
It was earlier argued here that judicial reliance upon a plaintiff's
job evaluation or productivity analysis or upon any similar means
of determining the relative worth of work for the purpose of mea-
suring employer adherence to such a determination of relative
worth is inherently the imposition of a disparate impact standard.
Such a reliance is, by definition, the substitution of a standard in-
dependent of the basis for decision in fact utilized by the em-
ployer.1 74 It is nevertheless the case that such evidence may in
some circumstances give rise to a legitimate inference of illicit mo-
tive. If distinct job classifications appear to entail similar but une-
qual work (as measured by the job evaluation factors stated in the
Equal Pay Act's equal work standard) and if those classifications
are segregated, de facto, by gender, a substantial compensation dif-
ferential between the classifications might be inferred, for purposes
of a prima facie case, to be a consequence of an employer decision
to compensate the female classification at a lower rate because it is
staffed predominantly be females.17' The plaintiff's independent
evidence of comparative value in such circumstances purports to
assess only the credibility of the employer's existing basis for mak-
ing compensation decisions, and may, therefore, be said to be con-
sistent with a disparate treatment theory.
178
There is, in the use of such evidence, nevertheless a substantial
risk of imposing a disparate impact theory. The credibility assess-
ment is made on the assumption that the definition of value or
worth assumed by the assessment tool is the appropriate under-
standing of desirable or necessary business practice. It is therefore
crucial both that independent evidence of comparable value be
probative of disparate treatment in the circumstance of the partic-
ular case and that the employer be permitted to rebut the infer-
174. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
175. See Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 445-46 (W.D. Wis. 1982). In
Briggs, the district court concluded that a showing of disparities in compensation between
job classifications segregated de facto by gender establishes a prima facie case of disparate
treatment where the classifications, although unequal, are so similar, in terms of job evalua-
tion factors, that they support an inference that the employer compensated the classifica-
tion predominately staffed by females at a lower rate because it was predominantly staffed
by females. In effect, Briggs interprets Gunther as relaxing the equal work standard and
rendering it a similar work standard.
176. Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)
(evidence of disparate effects may in some circumstances give rise to inference of illicit mo-
tive). See supra note 95.
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ence of illicit motive generated by such evidence by establishing a
credible gender neutral reason for the differential independent of
the valuation premises of the evaluative evidence employed by the
plaintiff.
Two examples may illustrate these points. An attempt by a
plaintiff to utilize a full scale job evaluation to establish the rela-
tive value of dissimilar work (rather than the similarity of unequal
work) is inconsistent with a disparate treatment theory because
such evidence does not suggest illicit motive. It suggests, instead,
that the employer has acted with respect to compensation in a
manner inconsistent with the presuppositions of the plaintiff's job
evaluation. Absent evidence of employer practice consistent with
those presuppositions, judicial reliance upon such evidence is, in
operation, a judicial insistence upon employer adoption of the
presuppositions. 17 With respect to the question of employer rebut-
tal, a judicial refusal to credit an employer's claimed reliance upon
some reason, e.g., the market, independent of job evaluation as the
cause of a compensation differential is, in operation, an insistence
that the sole legitimate business reason for the differential is job
evaluation.
Even within the restrictions suggested by these examples, reli-
ance upon independent job evaluations or upon a relaxed treat-
ment, under Title VII, of the Equal Pay Act's job evaluation fac-
tors for establishing the similarity rather than equality, of work
entails substantial risks of deviation from the policies underlying
the equal work standard. Any difference in jobs is, facially, a gen-
der neutral reason for a compensation differential.178 The reason
that a substantial differential between similar jobs gives rise to an
inference of disparate treatment is that the differential does not
appear warranted by the differences between jobs, an appearance
which is strongest in the case of equal work under the Equal Pay
177. This conclusion follows even if it is assumed that a post-Gunther prima facie case
is established simply by proof of compensation disparities and that an employer has the
burden of persuasion as well as production in establishing the "any other factor other than
sex" defense. In that circumstance, the plaintiff's use of independent job evaluation evi-
dence or of other independent evaluative evidence of worth is presumably an attempt at
rebutting the employer's asserted gender neutral reasons for a differential; but the rebuttal
is not responsive to the employer's reasons in any case in which the employer did not rely
upon the evaluation conducted by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's "rebuttal" is in effect an
argument that its evaluation is preferable to the defendant's because it has a lesser impact.
178. Cf. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 204 (1974) (although night
shift is not a working condition for purposes of equal work standard, it is, if bona fide, a
factor other than sex).
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Act's equal work standard. The strength of that inference in a case
in which a court analyzes a compensation differential between sim-
ilar and unequal jobs is a function of the court's willingness to
question the credibility of the employer's claim to good faith as-
sessment of the importance of the differences between those jobs.
That willingness should be informed by a recognition that it is
often dealing with an employer's guess regarding the importance of
differences. It is not the court's task under a disparate treatment
theory to determine whether a differential is warranted by its view
of the importance of differences. Rather, it is the court's task to
determine whether a differential apparently unwarranted by the
importance of differences justifies even a tentative inference that
the differential was motivated by gender.
Similar conclusions follow if the claim made is that the job eval-
uation system in fact utilized by an employer is discriminatory. An
evaluation system which relies upon subjective judgment may and
often does have a disparate impact on females. Jobs predominantly
staffed by females are often compensated at a lower rate than jobs
predominantly staffed by males as a consequence of the evalua-
tions made by the system. Such an impact may be attributable to
the subjective character of the judgment made under job evalua-
tion systems and may be attributable to presuppositions concern-
ing the meaning of value inherent in such systems. Any subjective
system entails a risk of illicit motive.179 For example, formal job
evaluation values job characteristics of industrial jobs of the char-
acter traditionally staffed by men at a higher level than job charac-
teristics of service jobs of the character traditionally staffed by
women. 8 ' Although the disparate effect of the use of such a job
evaluation system may be viewed as admissible evidence of the
pretextual character of the use of such a system, invalidation of
the system on the ground that it has such an effect is clearly the
substitution of an independent standard of valuation (fairness) for
the standard adopted by the employer. Assessment of the job eval-
uation system in fact adopted by the employer in terms of that
system's overvaluation of, e.g., industrial job characteristics and
undervaluation of, e.g., service job characteristics is equally such a
substitution. The purpose of such an assessment is measurement of
the necessity or desirability of the facially gender neutral standard
in fact adopted by the employer in terms of an external valuation
179. See supra note 131.
180. See TRIEMAN, supra note 87, at 1332-33.
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standard, the undesirability of disparate impact, adopted by a
court. Both such forms of judicial inquiry constitute precisely what
Congress sought to avoid by the equal work standard and both
such forms of inquiry should therefore be avoided under a dispa-
rate treatment understanding of Gunther.
2. Employer Failure to Comply With the Mandates of a Stan-
dard Adopted by the Employer
In Gunther, the "direct evidence" of intentional discrimination
relied upon by the plaintiff was that the employer's evaluation sys-
tem determined that female correctional officers should be paid
95% as much as male correctional officers but the employer in fact
paid female officers 70% as much as males.'81 That disparity, if
unexplained by considerations independent of gender, clearly
raises an inference of illicit motive. It is moreover an inference
upon which a court may rely without impairing the congressional
policies underlying the Equal Pay Act's equal work standard. The
employer's standard for evaluating value, not an externally im-
posed standard for that determination, is the basis for judicial
decision.
There are, however, important distinctions which should be
made in relying upon an employer's failure to adhere to its own
standard for establishing compensation. It is, for example, possible
that the employer will adhere to its job evaluation determination
by compensating employees assigned a job predominantly staffed
by females at the rate determined by the employer's evaluation
system, but will pay employees assigned jobs predominantly
staffed by males at a rate higher than that determined by the sys-
tem. One explanation of such a discrepancy is that it is a gender
based decision. Another explanation is that the employer paid a
higher rate for the latter category of jobs by relying on the market;
the employer could not find a sufficient number of qualified em-
ployees at the rate predicted by its system to staff available posi-
tions.""2 If the market explanation of the discrepancy is believed,
liability in spite of that explanation is liability imposed for reasons
of disparate impact. 83 It is, moreover, liability imposed on the ba-
sis of an external standard of desirability or necessity. Employer
reliance upon the market is undesirable where its internal system
181. 452 U.S. at 180.
182. See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
183. See id. at 356.
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predicts other than the market rate for labor.
Gunther presents a more difficult problem if an employer in a
Gunther factual situation claims reliance on the market. The em-
ployer is then claiming that a reduction from the rate mandated by
its internal system is justified by the availability of female labor at
a lower rate. There is in such a case, however, no difference in
principle. This is so because an employer's job evaluation system is
often adopted as an adjunct to a compensation system which relies
primarily on market rates for labor; the market rate is a primary
basis for employer decision and job evaluation is a means of ap-
proximating that basis for jobs with no readily ascertainable mar-
ket rate.'" Unless an employer acts inconsistently with the under-
lying reasons for its use of job evaluation, an inference of disparate
treatment is not warranted. If the employer failed to investigate
the market rate for jobs predominantly staff by males, or compen-
sated such male positions at the rate predicted by its evaluation
system despite a different market rate for such jobs, a disparate
treatment finding may be warranted. The mere fact of reliance on
a lower market rate for significantly different jobs staffed predomi-
nantly be females should not, however, constitute a violation
within the meaning of the disparate treatment model unless reli-
ance on a lower market rate may legitimately be characterized as
functionally equivalent to disparate treatment.
As noted here earlier, a functional equivalence characterization
was mandated by Congress for Equal Pay Act purposes where
work is substantially equal.' That characterization is however not
possible in circumstances in which work is not substantially equal
without breaching the congressional policy underlying the equal
work standard of the Equal Pay Act. It is not possible because a
judicial conclusion precluding employer reliance upon lower mar-
ket rates for work which is predominantly performed by females
and which is not equal to work predominantly performed by males
necessitates the substitution of judicial standards of compensation
for employer decision precluded by that congressional policy. To
ban employer reliance upon the market rate for a job where that
market rate cannot be shown to be gender rather than job specific
in its valuations is to impose on employers the effects of both self-
selection on the part of female workers and past discrimination on
the part of society writ large. Such an allocation is of course pre-
184. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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cisely what a disparate impact standard effects, but disparate
treatment theory attempts no such shifting of burdens.
3. Internal Inconsistencies in the Operation of the Employer's
Compensation System and Intentional Job Segregation
As was pointed out here earlier, some Equal Pay Act cases rely
upon internal inconsistencies in the application of the compensa-
tion principles the employer purported to utilize in analyzing equal
work issues. 186 Such inconsistencies are evidence of gender based
decision making. Inconsistent application of a facially gender neu-
tral criterion for decisions having disparate gender consequences
suggests that the criterion is used as a pretext for disparate treat-
ment. If, as in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass,18 7 an employer purports
to compensate on the basis of estimates of the relative productivity
of different jobs, but appears to have violated the internal logic of
those estimates by compensating work predominantly performed
by women at a rate inconsistent with that internal logic, an infer-
ence of disparate treatment is warranted. Judicial reliance upon
such evidence is consistent with the policies underlying the equal
work standard because it is reliance upon the employer's actual be-
havior and upon the employer's stated premises for that behavior
rather than reliance upon an external and problematic standard of
valuation.
It was further argued earlier that disparate treatment in job as-
signment decisions is a basis for concluding that a difference in
compensation between a job to which access for females is cur-
rently precluded and a job to which access for males is currently
permitted itself constitutes disparate treatment where the compen-
sation differential is a function of the employer's evaluation of the
value of the jobs or reliance upon the market rate for labor for
those jobs.'88 For Equal Pay Act purposes, this theory of disparate
treatment would be operable only where the jobs in issue entailed
"equal work." If the jobs entail equal work, however, the possible
fact that there is a Title VII BFOQ defense to the job segregation
should not preclude an Equal Pay Act remedy, as there is no
BFOQ defense under the Equal Pay Act. For purposes of Title VII,
there is a BFOQ defense to disparate gender treatment, but that
defense is applicable by its terms only to hiring and assignment
186. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
187. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 405 (1970).
188. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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decisions.1 s9 In short, the theory would be available under Title
VII to attack a compensation differential related to disparate
treatment in hiring and job assignment decisions even where there
is a BFOQ defense available to that disparate treatment.
In form, the disparate treatment alleged by the foregoing theory
is "sex plus" discrimination. The employment decision in issue,
here the compensation decision, is founded both upon gender and
upon some criterion independent of gender. Gunther was itself
such a case. Females were excluded from positions as male correc-
tional officers (purportedly on the basis on a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification) and male correctional officers were paid at a
rate purportedly determined by the value of the male correctional
counselor's work, either as determined by the market, or as deter-
mined by the employer's internal valuation system.190 The com-
pensation decision was on these premises based upon considera-
tions independent of gender, but those considerations are not
separable from the job. The employer either relied upon a gender
neutral evaluation of the value of the job or on the market rate for
labor for that job. Because access to the job was dependent upon
gender, the compensation paid male correctional counselors was
"sex plus" compensation. The evaluated or market determined
value of the work "plus" gender based access to that work deter-
mined who would and who would not receive the compensation
paid for the work.""1
Four points should be made about this theory. First, the availa-
bility of the theory to any given potential plaintiff should be de-
pendent upon the continued presence, at the time of any chal-
lenged compensation payment, of an employer rule or policy which
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). It is possible to argue that the theory would so
compromise the policy underlying the BFOQ defense that the defense should be assertable.
In a sense, the "sex plus" theory, when applied to a compensation claim, remedies job as-
signment discrimination despite the immunity of that discrimination from exposure to lia-
bility in instances in which the BFOQ defense is applicable. Note, however, that the BFOQ
defense is so narrow that impairment of the statutory policy underlying it is unlikely. See
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
190. 452 U.S. at 164-65.
191. In Taylor v. Charley Bros., 25 FEP Cases 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981), the court appears
to have relied at least in part upon such a sex plus theory, although relying primarily upon a
pattern or practice of intentional job segregation by gender in finding discrimination in
compensation. Its theory is distinguishable from that advocated in the above text. The argu-
ment in the text is that an express gender component (job segregation) of a compensation
differential is a ground for liability. The Charley Bros. argument was that an intent to com-
pensate workers in a particular job classification at a lower rate because the job classifica-




reserves a job exclusively for males. Although it may be argued
that there is a gender component to any compensation payment
made to a female worker who was at any time in the past excluded
from a higher paying position for reasons of gender, reliance upon
the current compensation effects of past hiring or assignment dis-
crimination appears precluded by the policy of repose underlying
Title VII's relatively short filing periods. 192 The source of the gen-
der component of challenged compensation is, under the theory
postulated here, current and intentional job segregation, not past
acts of hiring or job assignment discrimination.198
Second, the theory would not be available if the form of job as-
signment discrimination is issue is disparate impact. There is, in
that event, no gender component to the compensation available to
support a disparate treatment theory.'
Third, the proposed theory should be available to any female
holding a job in the employer's workforce regardless of the similar-
ity or lack of similarity between the job she holds and the job re-
served exclusively for males so long as the plaintiff female attacks
the differential between her compensation and the male job com-
pensation on the ground that the differential is based upon differ-
ences in the jobs. Components of a compensation differential be-
tween a female employee's compensation and the compensation
paid for a job reserved for males based on characteristics of the
male job (e.g., greater skills or responsibilities or the greater profit-
ability of the functions performed in the male job) are dependent
192. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); United Air Lines v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). Compare Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
309-13 (1977) (employer may rebut prima facie case by establishing that statistical dispara-
ties are consequence of pre-Act or pre-filing period discrimination) with Trout v. Hidalgo,
417 F. Supp. 873, 885 (D.D.C. 1981) (plaintiff need not control for pre-Act discrimination if
it 'continues to affect post-Act compensation). See infra notes 247-72 and accompanying
text. One explanation of comparable worth theory is that it circumvents the question of
timeliness by rendering an effect of a past act of discrimination itself a violation. See infra
note 260.
193. Cf. Guardians Assoc. of New York City v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d
Cir. 1980) (policy which continues into charge filing period is continuing violation), aff'd on
other grounds, 51 U.S.L.W. 5105 (July 1, 1983); Saltz v. ITT Financial Corp., 619 F.2d 738
(8th Cir. 1980); Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1980). But cf.
Bronze Shields Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. Civil Serv. 667 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1981) (use of
eligibility roster derived from use of discriminatory test not a continuing violation).
194. The theory therefore, also should be distinguished from Professor Blumrosen's
theory that wage discrimination should be presumed from de facto job segregation. See
supra note 124-35 and accompanying text. The present theory requires proof of disparate
treatment in individual cases; it does not rely upon a presumption amounting in fact to a
disparate impact theory.
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upon gender if access to the male job is dependent upon gender.19
If a female worker lacks the gender neutral qualifications for the
job reserved for males, gender is arguably not a "but-for" cause of
the challenged differential. Access to the male job, and male job
compensation, would have been denied for reasons independent of
gender; but a female employee's interest or lack of interest in the
male job is at least a'rguably immaterial to the question of compen-
sation discrimination. Although intentionally discriminatory job
segregation would be deterred by judicial acceptance of the pro-
posed theory, it is not job segregation which is remedied by the
theory; rather, it is the explicit gender basis for the compensation
differential which is the target of the theory. Whether or not a fe-
195. Assume, for example, that an employer pays male guards at a rate higher than
female guards because male guards perform duties requiring greater responsibilities and ef-
fort than the duties performed by female guards. Women are barred from jobs as "male"
guards. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). The elements of the
male guards' work identified by the employer as the reason for its compensation decision are
gender neutral. The opportunity to perform tasks involving that greater responsibility and
effort is, however, foreclosed for women. The greater responsibility and effort criteria are
themselves based explicitly on gender by virtue of intentional job segregation.
Notice that the discriminatory component of the male guard's wage cannot be separated
from the gender neutral factors relied upon by the employer as justifying the compensation
differential. All of the differential is attributable to gender because all of the legitimate
factors which explain it are attributable to gender. The disparate treatment involved does
not take the usual form; compensation for a female job at a lower rate because the job is
staffed by female workers. Indeed, the employer might in the contemplated circumstances
compensate at the lower rate even if "female" guard work was performed predominantly by
males. Rather the disparate treatment involved takes the form of gender as a "cause" of a
result. Cf. Cox, supra note 47, at 184 n.113 (distinguishing discrimination as cause and dis-
crimination as disparate treatment for National Labor Relations Act purposes, but noting
that disparate treatment has a different meaning under Title VII).
It may, of course, be argued that the form of compensation discrimination postulated is
not compensation discrimination, but job assignment discrimination. It is true that female
workers denied access to a "male job" may, in the absence of a BFOQ defense, recoup a
compensation differential in the form of a back pay remedy for job assignment discrimina-
tion. It is also true that the rationale for concluding that a compensation differential is
gender based where job assignment is gender based is a gender criterion for job assignment
rather than for compensation. But a compensation differential is not, in circumstances in
which the employer currently assigns employees on the basis of gender, a mere effect of an
act of classification by gender; it is compensation by gender as well. Cf. City of Los Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (compensation differential founded
upon projection of longevity, itself founded upon gender, is disparate treatment).
Although the differential at issue in Gunther may be said to have been based upon gender
to the extent that women as a group were barred from access to those gender neutral aspects
of the male guard job which explained a higher rate of compensation, no individual female
was barred from such access for reasons of gender who would not have qualified for the male
guard position for reasons independent of gender. Gender would not, in such an individual's
case, constitute a necessary condition to the differential because gender neutral reasons for
non-access would constitute sufficient conditions for the differential.
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male employee would seek the male job if access by females was
not precluded, the fact remains that the differential is based on the
characteristics of the male job and access to the male job is based
on gender.196 The differential is therefore equally based on gender.
Fourth, there is in this theory again no inconsistency with the
policies underlying the equal work standard. The court relies on an
express gender classification, not an externally imposed standard
of desirability or necessity.
4. Express Gender Classifications and Multiple Regression
It should be apparent that any express gender classification and
any classification, such as that at issue in City of Los Angeles De-
partment of Water and Power v. Manhart,197 synonymous with
gender which operates as a basis for compensation decision may be
attacked under Gunther without impairing the congressional poli-
cies underlying the equal work standard. In such cases, a court re-
lies upon the expressed conduct of the employer; it need not decide
the disparate treatment issue on the basis of inference." '
A potential means of identifying gender classifications which are
not express is multiple regression. Regression is a statistical tech-
nique for estimating, quantitatively, the influence of factors (inde-
pendent variables) thought to have affected the outcome (depen-
dent variable) of some decision making process.1" In a
196. Self-selection is distinguishable from the question of qualification, supra note
195. If the employer controls the question of initial job assignment, self-selection is immate-
rial to the matter of access. If the employee has a least partial control over the question of
job assignment, that control, assuming intentionally segregated jobs, cannot be exercised.
The argument that the possibility of non-competition between groups (males and females,
as a consequence of the socialization process do not compete for some jobs) must be ac-
counted for, although generally persuasive, loses its force in the contemplated circumstance.
Roberts, supra note 88, at 192-93.
197. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
198. On these grounds, the cases postulated in the Supreme Court's Gunther opinion
entailing express disparate treatment are clearly within the scope of the interpretation of
Gunther contemplated by the text. See 452 U.S. at 178-79.
199. See generally BALDUS & COLE, supra note 51, at 173-80, 240-86; Bloom & Kil-
lingsworth, Pay Discrimination Research and Litigation: The Use of Regression, 21 Indus.
Rel. 318 (U. Cal. 1982); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 702 (1980); Finkelstein, supra note 142; Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administra-
tive Proceedings, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1442 (1973), reprinted in M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE
METHODS IN LAW 211 (1978); Gwartney, supra note 88, at 653-59; Note, Beyond the Prima
Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HAv.
L. REv. 387 (1975); Note, Multiple Regression Analysis: A Statistical Approach to Assess-
ing and Correcting Salary Inequity, 1982 U. ILL. L.F. 449. For a judicial attempt at summa-
rizing the technique, see Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 267-
79 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
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compensation discrimination case, the dependent variable is com-
pensation; the independent variables are the factors claimed to
have been considered in establishing compensation or claimed to
constitute accurate proxies for productivity on the assumption that
compensation was established on the basis of productivity. Inde-
pendent variables may, on human capital premises, constitute
characteristics of workers (e.g., education and experience); may, on
job evaluation premises, constitute characteristics of work (e.g., ef-
fort and responsibility); or may constitute both worker and job
characteristics.20 0 A regression equation is estimated by obtaining
data regarding the compensation of each of the employees to be
studied and by compiling data regarding independent variable val-
ues (e.g., years of experience) for each such employee. The equa-
tion is the formula which best fits this data 01 in describing the
relationship between the explanatory variables and average com-
pensation. It is expressed so as to indicate in monetary terms (a
regression coefficient) the effect of each independent variable on
average compensation, holding other independent variables con-
stant.0 2 For example, a regression equation in which only years of
experience and education were considered as explanatory variables
might indicate that average compensation equals $10,000 plus
$2000 (per year of job experience) plus $5000 (for college degree).
The regression coefficient for the job experience variable is $2000.
Holding all other considered factors constant, average compensa-
tion can be expected to increase $2000 for every year of job experi-
ence. Notice that the formula estimates the average effect on com-
pensation of an extra year of experience; individual cases may
200. Independent variables selected for a regression study might, on human capital
premises, take the form of education, experience and continuity of employment proxies for
productivity. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Michigan, 495 F. Supp. 1021, 1061-
65 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Mincer & Polachek, supra note 64; Malkiel & Malkiel, supra note 66.
The independent variables selected may also, however, take the from, on job evaluation
premises, of characteristics of jobs within a firm. See WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note
17, at 82-89. A regression study may include both job evaluation variables and human capi-
tal (productivity) variables. See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp.
224, 284-87 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
201. See H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 329 (1960); infra note 208. The legal question
asked by a disparate treatment theory may be viewed as an issue of causation; did gender
cause the compensation differential in issue? Judicial use of regression seeks to infer such
causation from evidence, provided by a regression study, of a relationship between variables.
With respect to the risks run in inferring causation from relationship, see H BLALOCK, SO-
CIAL STATISTICS 337-43 (1960); D.HUNTSBERGER, D. CROFT, P. BILLINGSLEY, STATISTICAL IN-
FERENCE FOR MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 453 (2d ed. 1980); Roberts, supra note 88, at 179.
202. See Fisher, supra note 199, at 706.
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deviate from that estimate.2"
In the regression study typically used in this context, gender
(group status) is included as an independent variable.0 4 The mea-
sure of the influence of the gender variable (the regression coeffi-
cient for group status) predicted by a regression equation is, in ef-
fect, a measure of the average disparate impact on female
employees of the employer's compensation system. 0 5 Disparate
treatment is inferred from disparate impact.206 Trout v. Hidalgo,07
involving alleged job assignment and promotion discrimination, il-
lustrates these points.
The plaintiffs in Trout sought to establish discrimination in part
on the basis of a regression analysis purporting to measure the in-
fluence of gender on compensation in the employer's workforce. On
average, women earned between 82% and 84% of male salaries in
that workforce. The regression analysis sought to account for these
average disparities by examining level of education, years of service
with the employer, years of other work experience, and gender as
independent explanatory variables. Salary was treated as a depen-
dent variable. By utilizing data regarding each independent varia-
ble for employees in the workforce, the regression analysis esti-
mated an equation which assigned a measure of the influence,
expressed in monetary terms, of each independent variable on the
dependent salary variable.2 0 By using the equation, it was esti-
203. See BALDUS & CoLE, supra note 51, at 245; Fisher, supra note 199, at 725; Rob-
erts, supra note 88, at 184.
204. See BALDUS & CoLz, supra note 51, at 242; Fisher, supra note 199, at 722. It is
however, also possible to estimate separate equations for men and women and to compare
regression coefficients for particular variables in the equations. Fisher, supra note 199, at
724. See infra note 230.
205. See BALDUS & CoLa, supra note 51, at 245; see also supra text accompanying
note 142.
206. See BALDUS & CoLE, supra note 51, at 245. Disparate impact is a legitimate basis,
if properly confined so as to be probative, for inferring disparate treatment. See Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). It is, however, crucial that race or gender
neutral influences which may explain race or gender disparities in the consequences of an
employment practice be controlled. See id. at 309.
207. 517 F. Supp. 873 (D.D.C. 1981).
208. Data regarding each independent variable for each employee may be conceived as
producing, when plotted against the independent and dependent variables, a series of scat-
ter points in multi-dimensional space. Regression seeks to estimate an equation which best
explains these scatter points in terms of the variables. Specifically, regression seeks to find
the equation which best explains the scatter points "in the sense that the sum of the
squared deviations between predicted and actual [dependent variable] values is minimized."
Fisher, supra note 199, at 707 (explaining bivariate regression). The equation so estimated
assigns a measure of the average influence of each independent variable, a regression coeffi-
cient, on the dependent variable. For example, in Trout, the formula estimated that the
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mated that the component of the salary differential attributable to
the gender variable ranged between $2,200 and $3,500 for different
years.209 The employer attacked the plaintiff's regression analysis
on the grounds that, inter alia, it failed to account for such inde-
pendent variables as job level in the workforce21 0 and that the in-
dependent variables utilized by the study were imperfect proxies
for the actual gender neutral considerations which influenced sal-
ary decisions. More specifically, the analysis utilized years of expe-
rience as a factor, but failed to take into account the character or
type of such experience."' The court rejected these attacks on the
grounds that, inter alia, the job level could not be considered be-
cause it may have been tainted by discrimination in promotion de-
cisions and that the defendant had failed to introduce a regression
analysis taking into account character of experience. 1 2
From the perspective of a disparate treatment theory of discrim-
ination, Trout suggests that the evidentiary use of multiple regres-
service with employer variable added $1,209 to salary for each year of service. 517 F. Supp.
at 878 n.11.
209. 517 F. Supp at 883-84.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. To the extent that promotion and job assignment discrimination constitute
the gravamen of the plaintiff's theory, it may be legitimate to decline to include job and job
level as independent variables because the resulting regression study will produce results
which assume that job assignment and promotion were independent of gender. See James v.
Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1978). Ignoring such variables in a
case alleging compensation discrimination is not warranted. See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l
Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 305 n.95 (N.D. Tex. 1980); See also infra notes 230-46 and
accompanying text. Moreover, to the extent that a plaintiff seeks to use a regression study
to establish that gender influenced compensation and to infer promotion discrimination
from that influence, a court is in effect asked to assume a conclusion both in instances in
which job and job level are included and where they are excluded. If the variables are omit-
ted, the court is asked to infer promotion discrimination from a salary disparity attributed
to gender where the attribution is itself based on an assumption, not established by inde-
pendent evidence, that job assignment and promotion decisions were tainted by gender. If
the variables are excluded and the regression shows no statistically significant gender com-
ponent of a differential, the court may be asked by an employer to infer that there is no
promotion or job assignment discrimination from a regression study which assumed those
facts. The difficulties inherent in assuming conclusions in this context are illustrated by
Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982). There, in a case in-
volving allegations of promotion and job assignment discrimination, the court rejected a
regression which sought to determine the influence of gender on salary but failed to control
for dissimilar jobs in the workforce. Id. at 70-71. The ground for that rejection was that job
differences clearly influence salary. The court nevertheless criticized the district court for
rejecting the regression study for failing to take into account job level on the ground that
job level might be tainted by discrimination in promotion. Id. at 71 n.26, 73 n.30. The court
failed to explain why "type of job" might not be similarly tainted by discrimination in job
assignment and why these "might be" possibilities should be assumed by the analysis.
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sion presents two distinct problems for a court seeking to confine
its inquiry to the conceptual boundaries of that theory - the
problem of substitution and the problem of variable selection.
a. The Problem of Implicit Government Regulation of Standards
for Compensation
The initial difficulty presented by multiple regression is that the
independent variables selected as explanatory influences upon
compensation may implicitly become imposed standards for com-
pensation when accepted by a court as a ground for inferring dis-
parate treatment. This difficulty is not present in the case in which
an employer has adopted an explicit policy regarding compensa-
tion from which a court may derive the considerations an employer
purported to utilize in making compensation decisions. To the ex-
tent that such considerations are quantifiable, they may be
adopted as independent variables in a regression study designed, in
effect, to measure the consistency with which the employer applied
such considerations.
Many employers do not, however, make explicit the bases for
their compensation decisions;21 8 rather, they make more or less ac-
curate guesses about productivity and compensate accordingly. A
regression study which seeks to determine whether these guesses
were tainted by gender must select gender neutral independent
variables which will serve as quantifiable proxies for productiv-
ity.214 In effect, the regression study substitutes the statistician's,
and if judicially accepted, the court's quantifiable approximations
of productivity for the employer's guesses about productivity.2 1 5 To
213. See Gwartney, supra note 88, at 657 n.68; Robertssupra note 88, at 183-92.
214. See, e.g., WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 17-43; see also supra note
200.
215. Notice that this process of substitution occurs both where the study utilizes job
evaluation (characteristics of the job) variables and where the study utilizes human capital
(characteristics of workers) variables. In the former case, the study in effect imposes job
evaluation as the standard for compensation. In the latter case, the study imposes the sup-
positions of human capital theory as the standard for valuation. An example may make this
imposition clearer. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 82 suggests use of job eval-
uation with the addition of a group status variable (percentage of incumbents in a job who
are female) to the compensable characteristics of job variables used in job evaluations to
estimate the weights to be assigned such characteristics. In a job evaluation not utilizing
such a group status variable, multiple regression is used to predict appropriate weights from
existing wages. The evaluation rationalizes an existing compensation system by determining
the weight (in the form of the regression coefficient identified by the regression for each
compensable characteristic) that system assigns the compensable job characteristics identi-
fied by the evaluation. The addition of a group status variable becomes a measure of "dis-
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the extent that the independent variables explain portions of a dif-
ferential, it may be inferred that the employer consciously or sub-
consciously considered that variable (or some factor related to the
variable) and weighed it in the fashion suggested by the regression
equation. But the fact remains that the plaintiff's regression equa-
tion specifies the plaintiff's view of considerations (independent
variables) which are legitimate explanations of a compensation
differential.
Although it is possible to contend that any such substitution
contravenes the underlying policies of the Equal Pay Act's equal
work standard, the difficulty of identifying disparate treatment in
the litigation process may warrant reliance upon multiple regres-
sion if the risk of substitution can be minimized. In particular,
three aspects of the substitution difficulty should be recognized by
a court asked to rely upon regression. First, the proxy variables
employed by a statistician are more or less accurate measures of
true productivity. To the extent that they are imperfect measures
of true productivity, their imperfections can be reflected in a re-
gression study as "discrimination." Part of a compensation differ-
ential that is in fact attributable to true differences in productivity
will be attributed by the regression study to gender.216 This diffi-
crimination." Id. at 84. The difficulty is that in fact the group status variable is potentially a
measure of factors not included in the regression study as independent variables where
omitted factors are correlated with group status. Id. at 85 n.8. Thus, in effect, the use of the
suggested technique identifies as discriminatory any influence not identified by the regres-
sion study as an independent variable. Because WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES would impose on
the employer the burden of identifying additional variables and of quantifying those vari-
ables, id. at 85, and because that burden cannot, on comparable worth premises, be met
with respect to differences in jobs as an independent variable, the suggestion operates as an
imposed job evaluation system.
216. In technical terms, this phenomenon is labeled "underadjustment bias." See Fin-
kelstein, supra note 142, at 747-49; Robertssupra note 88, at 183-92. See also L. HORwrrz
& L. FERLEYER, STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 266-67 (1980) (discussing the "regression
fallacy"); Birnbaum, Procedures for Detection of Salary Equity in SALARY EQuITY, DE-
TECTING SEX BIAS IN SALARIES AMONG COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 123-26
(T.Pezzullo & B. Brittinham eds. 1979). Underadjustment may occur where productivity
proxies used in a regression analysis are imperfectly correlated with the employer's actual
(and gender neutral) assessments of productivity. If productivity is correlated with gender, a
regression equation predicted from such imperfect proxies will "underadjust" for the influ-
ence of productivity differences on compensation in the sense that it will attribute the influ-
ence of such differences to gender. See Birnbaum, at 126; Finkelstein, supra note 142, at
747; Roberts, supra note 88, at 186.
It is arguably true that what is important for disparate treatment purposes is determining
the influence of considerations the employer can observe, Fisher, supra note 199, at 725, and
that imperfections in proxy variables are therefore of less concern where it can be inferred
that the employer's assessment of productivity was founded on the proxy utilized by the




culty is exacerbated from the perspective of disparate treatment
theory because the relevant question for purposes of that theory is
whether the employer's guess regarding productivity was tainted
by gender, not whether the employer's guess deviated from true
productivity. Not only is the productivity proxy used in the regres-
sion study an imperfect measure of true productivity, it is a proxy
for the employer's guess regarding productivity.217 Even a perfect
proxy for true productivity risks a finding of "discrimination" (in
the sense of disparate treatment) where none occurred.
Second, selection of proxy variables is a process rife with implicit
normative judgments regarding questions of both the meaning of
value and the meaning of discrimination. At the most obvious
level, the choice between proxies which emphasize the characteris-
tics of workers or proxies which emphasize the characteristics of
work implicitly entails normative judgments about the meaning of
"worth" or of appropriate means of approximating productivity.""
At a more subtle level, the selection and definition of independent
explanatory variables entails implicit normative judgments about
appropriate anti-discrimination policy. For example, an experience
variable defined in terms of years of work experience might be se-
lected because there is data available for quantifying that variable.
Use of that definition nevertheless ignores the possibility that the
character of experience is also relevant to productivity. Even if it is
assumed that data regarding character of experience is unavailable
to the statistician in quantifiable form, a decision to utilize years of
experience as an imperfect productivity proxy rests on an implicit
normative judgment that male and female investments in
equivalent years of experience should generate an equivalent re-
turn on that investment.2' The relevant question for disparate
determining the reliability of that inference. The fact remains that the observed and gender
neutral characteristic utilized by the plaintiff's statistician may not be the gender neutral
consideration, observed or not, utilized by the employer.
217. See Finkelstein, supra note 142, at 747, 747 n.49; Roberts, supra note 88, at 180,
190. See also Fisher, supra note 199, at 725.
218. See supra note 90.
219. See COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 17, at 44. Cf. Ramsay, A Generalized Multi-
ple Regression Model for Predicting Faculty Salaries and Estimating Sex Bias in SALARY
EQurry, supra note 216, at 39-44 (influence of normative assumptions upon choosing be-
tween multicollinearity and mispecification as threats to the validity of regression). The no-
tion that unavailability of more perfect data warrants such a decision does not alter the
characterization stated in the text. The risk of imperfection in the proxy (and the risk of the
distortion in result implied by the risk of imperfection) is allocated to the employer under
circumstances in which the character and relevance of the imperfection are known. Such an
allocation itself implies the stated normative judgment. For an example of legal arguments
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treatment purposes is, of course, the employer's use of the experi-
ence factor. The absence of data regarding quality of experience
(e.g., the absence of business records regarding quality of experi-
ence) at the time of litigation, may or may not indicate the pres-
ence or character of data regarding quality of experience available
to the employer at the time of the compensation decision.
The third aspect of the substitution problem which should be of
concern to a court is the question of burden and character of proof
in specifying the explanatory variables to be used.220 If it is as-
sumed that an employer has the burden of establishing that it did
not engage in disparate treatment,221 the above objections to multi-
ple regression might well take the form of an argument that an
employer's defense founded on a regression study is an after the
fact, and inaccurate, rationalization of its past behavior. If the
burden is instead on the plaintiff to establish disparate treatment,
the plaintiff's regression study is subject to the objection that it
imperfectly captures the employer's actual behavior and therefore
pro tanto imposes a governmental compensation standard.2 3
regarding the viability of proxy variables as measure of productivity and the failure of a
proxy variable to distinguish between distinct forms of human capital investment, see
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 311 n.105, 314-17 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
220. With respect to the question of burden of persuasion, See infra notes 242-59 and
accompanying text.
221. The employer would have such a burden, under Professor Blumrosen's proposal,
upon proof of the existence of job segregation. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note
8, at 457-65. The use of multiple regression on the assumption that job segregation estab-
lishes a prima facie case would therefore resemble an effort at identifying back pay for pur-
poses of a remedy. See generally Note, Multiple Regression Analysis, supra note 199. It is
also possible that employers will have such a burden under the Gunther opinion's rationale.
See infra notes 272-83 and accompanying text.
222. See WOMEN,WORK AND WAGES, supra note 8, at 85 (employer should have burden
to show that additional variables should be included); Finkelstein, supra note 142, at 744
(employer should have burden to show that additional data was available and actually used
by employer in making decisions). For an example of a similar judicial argument, see James
v. Stockholm Valves and Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 332 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1034 (1978) (employer may not include an education variable not in fact relied upon in
making decisions).
223. If it is assumed that a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination
in compensation and that an employer must then rebut such a case either by attacking the
adequacy of the plaintiff's evidence (e.g., the plaintiff's regression failed to include relevant
variables) or by affirmatively establishing a non-gender reason for a compensation differen-
tial (e.g., by introducing a regression study including variables claimed to explain the differ-
ential), a judicial insistence upon a perfect regression model for purposes of a prima facie
case is unwarranted. See, e.g., Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873, 882-84 (D.D.C. 1981);
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 314 (N.D. Tex. 1980). On the
other hand, the plaintiff's regression should meet some minimum level of credibility by in-
cluding obviously relevant explanatory and gender neutral variables. See Valentino v.
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The substitution problem is in either case a problem of the
weight to be assigned an imperfect and potentially deceptive evi-
dentiary tool.2 4 If the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
directed to the issue of disparate treatment, 26 a regression analysis
which includes plausibly relevant independent variables probative
of that issue might suffice for the prima facie case. 2 6 An em-
ployer's rebuttal might take the form of a regression analysis speci-
fying different or additional explanatory variables.227 The question
is the evidentiary foundation an employer must lay for claiming
that such different or additional variables explain the portion of a
compensation differential attributed by the plaintiff's analysis to
gender.
2 2 8
To the extent that the employer's bases for making compensa-
tion decisions have not been expressed in formal policies, the
plaintiff's regression will be founded upon explanatory variables
she selects as proxies for the employer's informal guesses regarding
productivity. The employer's rebuttal in such circumstances will be
similarly grounded. If the employer is precluded from utilizing dif-
ferent or additional (and plausible) proxies in rebuttal absent
proof of the actual use of such considerations, the consequence is a
one-way street which artificially defines disparate treatment in
terms of the compensation standards asserted by the plaintiff, and
United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wilkins v. Univ. of Houston,
654 F.2d 388, 402-07 (5th Cir. 1981).
224. For judicial analysis sensitive to the relationship between legal theories of dispa-
rate treatment and disparate impact and the relationship between the use of multiple re-
gression and those theories, see Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp.
224, 262-65, 279-85 (N.D. Tex 1980).
225. But see infra notes 262-276 and accompanying text.
226 Cf. Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981). "The
prima facie case serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most com-
mon nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection." Id.
227. Cf. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977) (employer,
by refining statistical analysis to explain, disparate results of hiring process by "race neu-
tral" factors such as pre-Act discrimination, may rebut prima facie case).
228. Cf. Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 73 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
"Absent clear, affirmative evidence that promotions were made in accordance with neutral,
objective standards consistently applied, there is no assurance that level or rank is an ap-
propriate explanatory variable, untainted by discrimination." Id. Notice that this statement
in effect precludes "subjective" standards and thereby imposes a disparate impact theory:
subjectivism is rejected as a basis for decision due to the risk that it is tainted, not because
it has been found to have been tainted. See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567
(1978) (rejecting such a view for disparate treatment purposes). Cf. Bartholet, Application
of Title VII To Jobs In High Places, 95 HAv. L. REv. 947, 973-78, 1006-08 (1982) (treating
attacks on subjective employment practices as properly within impact theory).
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accepted by the court, as appropriate bases for compensation.'2"
b. The Problem of Variable Selection: Significant Differences in
Jobs or Job Levels as Explanations of Compensation Differentials
Typically, regression studies of compensation differentials utilize
a group status variable as one of the independent variables
thought to influence a dependent compensation variable.10 The
gender variable may explain components of the dependent salary
variable not explained by the influence of gender neutral indepen-
dent variables. 3 1 The gender neutral variables used in a regression
analysis are, as previously indicated, proxies for nonquantifiable
gender neutral considerations."3 "
229. See Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 685 F.2d 743, 750 n.2 (1st Cir. 1982) ("friendship",
albeit an idiocyncratic reason for a differential, is nevertheless a legitimate factor other than
sex). But see infra note 239.
230. See, e.g., BALDUS & COLE, supra note 51, at 251-62; Fisher, supra note 199, at
721-26; Gwartney, supra note 88, at 654-59.
. The regression formula estimated by such a study is a single equation. An alternative
occasionally utilized is estimating separate equations for males and females without includ-
ing a group status variable in either. See, e.g.,Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas,
505 F. Supp 224, 278 (N.D. Tex 1980); Finkelstein, supra note 142, at 739-40 n.12; Fisher,
supra note 199, at 724; BALDUS &COLE, supra note 51, at 262. On human capital premises,
the separate equations approach infers discrimination if males and females receive different
rates of return on the productivity proxies (human capital investments they make), a deter-
mination made by comparing regression coefficients for each independent variable and view-
ing the difference between coefficients in the separate equations for any given variable as a
measure of discrimination. Id. A variation on this theme involves the calculation of separate
equations and the substitution of average levels of female attainment for male levels of
attainment for each independent variable in the male equation (male earnings function).
The result is an estimate of the average earnings females could expect if they were receiving
the same rate of return as males. The difference between that expected return and actual
average compensation is a measure of discrimination. See, e.g., Woumi, WORK AND WAGES,
supra note 17, at 42-43; Chiplin, supra note 66, at 247-52; Haworth, Gwartney & Haworth,
Earnings, Productivity, and Changes in Employment Discrimination During the 1960's, 65
Am. ECON. REv. 158, 161-63 (1975).
231. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 51, at 242; WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra
note 17, at 85 n.8. But see supra note 230.
232. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. On human capital theory premises,
compensation is a function of investment, e.g., education, experience, or continuity of work
experience. See supra notes 66, 85. A regression study based upon such investment variables
will presumably reflect accurately the employer's decision making process where the em-
ployer claims that it relied upon the independent variables used in the study. The difficulty
is that there is often substantial disagreement between the parties to employment discrimi-
nation litigation over precisely which variables should be included in the study. See Finkel-
stein, supra note 142, at 747, 753-54.
To the extent that a proxy variable for productivity (e.g. education) is badly correlated
with the employer's actual estimate of productivity, the regression analysis may attribute
components of a compensation differential to gender whereas in fact such components are
attributable to differences in productivity. See id. at 747-49; supra note 216. With respect to
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The difficulty with the use of such proxies in combination with a
group status variable is that, to the extent that they fail to account
for all gender neutral influences on compensation related to gen-
der, the regression study will erroneously identify the omitted gen-
der neutral influences as a gender influence. 3 If, for example,
years of work experience influences compensation and is related to
gender (males on average have more years of work experience than
females), a regression analysis which fails to include years of work
experience as an independent explanatory variable may at least
partially attribute the influence on compensation of that omitted
variable to the gender (group status) variable included in the
study. A decision to omit such a gender-related variable is in effect
a decision to treat the omitted variable as synonymous with gen-
der, and is therefore tantamount to the decision in Griggs v. Duke
the problem of the questionable accuracy of human capital variables as proxies for the em-
ployer's actual estimates of productivity, see generally Long, The Idiosyncratic Determiner-
sof Salary Differences inSALARY Equrry, supra note 216, at 145-53.
233. A failure to include a relevant and gender-neutral variable (or gender tainted va-
riable an attack on which is time barred) will attribute the influence of the omitted variable
to the gender variable and therefore identify that influence as discrimination. See e.g.,
BALDUS & COLE, supra note 51, at 273-75; WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 85
n.8; Roberts, supra note 88, at 254-58; Ramsay, supra note 219, at 41-44. See generally G.
WESOLOWSKY, MULTIPLE REGRESSION AND ANALYSIS OF VARIANcE 49-56 (1976).
The reason for this phenomenon is that, if the omitted variable is correlated with gender
(e.g. if years of education is omitted and women on average have fewer years of education), a
portion of the influence attributed to gender will in fact be attributable to differences in
education. The result is termed specification error or mispecification. See, e.g., BALDUS &
COLE, supra note 55, at 273; Fisher, supra note 199, at 708-09, 713-15; Ramsay, supra note
219, at 41-44.
Note that the problem of variable omission occurs both in cases in which a single equation
with a gender variable is used and in cases in which separate male and female equations are
used. In the latter instance, the influence of an omitted variable is not reflected in a gender
variable, but the assumptions upon which differences in rates of return on a human capital
investment (independent variable) are inferred to reflect discrimination are violated. See
Chiplin, supra note 66, at 250-51, 254-58; Haworth, supra note 230, at 163. If, for example,
there is a disparity between the male and female rates of return on years of experience (as
determined by separate equations estimating the influence of experience on compensation),
that difference is not appropriately inferred to constitute discrimination if education also
influences compensation and education is omitted as a variable. There may be differences in
rates of return on experience at different educational levels which explain the disparity be-
tween male and female rates of return on experience (assuming that gender and education
are correlated). See Malkiel & Malkiel, supra note 229, at 702-03 (addition of job level vari-
able correlated with gender explains differential utilizing separate equations for men and
women). Compare Vuyanich v. Republic Natl Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 278 (N.D.
Tex. 1980) (use of separate equations to show disparate treatment of twins with respect to
productivity factors) with id. at 284, 286-87 (regression must include both personal produc-
tivity and job characteristics variables).
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Power Co.s34 to treat the use of race-neutral employment criteria
correlated with race (that is, criteria having a disparate impact by
race) as race-based employer conduct.
Job classifications, and job levels within classifications, are often
segregated, de facto, by gender. Job differences and gender status
are therefore related. If a regression study controls for differences
in jobs by confining analysis to particular jobs or by treating job
differences as independent variables (the employer's claim being
that compensation was based on the employer's valuation of the
job or the market rate of labor for that job) , it is likely that
there will be no significant residual for gender. The independent
job variable (and other independent gender neutral variables) will
fully explain the dependent (salary or wage) variable.'5s To the ex-
tent that significant differences in segregated or partially segre-
gated jobs are not accounted for, the regression study will attribute
the influence of such job differences on compensation to the gender
variable.23 7 Omitting job classification as an explanation of com-
234. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
235. See Bloom & Killingsworth, supra note 199, at 323-26.
236. See Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 442 F. Supp. 593, 612-13 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd mem., 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978); WOMEN,WoRK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 24-25
n.9, 33, 33 n.19; Chiplin, supra note 66, at 254-58; Malkiel & Malkiel, supra note 66; COMPA-
RABLE WORTH, supra note 17, at 192-93. Cf. Tuckman, Salary Differences Among University
Faculty and Their Implications for the Future in SAv EQUFrrY, supra note 216, at 31-32;
(inclusion of field of study explains large portion of differential); Oaxaca, supra note 81
(large but incomplete portion of differential explained by human capital and other factors
within relatively broadly defined occupational groups).
237. See Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Wilkins v. Univ. of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 402-07 (5th Cir., 1981); Presseisen v. Swarthmore
College, 442 F. Supp. 593, 614-20 (E.D. Pa. 1977), af'd mem., 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978);
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 280-85 (N.D. Tex. 1980);
Agarwal v. McKee & Co., 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 8301 (N.D. Cal. 1977). From the point of
view of human capital theory, inclusion of occupation, job or job level within a firm as an
independent variable (or controlling for job or job level by restricting the sample studied)
may erroneously treat a dependent variable as an independent variable. See Chiplin, supra
note 66, at 255; Mincer, Comment in WoMEN IN THE LABOR MARKET, supra note 66, at 284-
85. At least in the case of job level (or promotion to higher job levels), human capital theory
would view advancement within a firm as a form of return on investment or as the mecha-
nism by which return on investment is obtained. Cf. Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 458 F. Supp. 314, 324 n.3 (W.D. N.Car. 1978) (salary classification is not a productivity
variable but a result of productivity factors).
From the point of view of a disparate treatment theory, however, neither job nor job level
can safely be ignored as independent variables absent proof that an employer is currently
engaged in disparate treatment in making job assignment or promotion decisions. It is possi-
ble to conclude either that the character of distinct jobs should not be a ground for an
employer's compensation decision or that de facto job segregation warrants a legal rule pre-
cluding employer consideration of the job as a basis for compensation decisions, but neither
conclusion can be derived from a disparate treatment theory. Both preclude employer con-
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pensation differentials is therefore again tantamount to treating
job classification as a neutral criterion subject to a disparate im-
pact prohibition, except in cases in which a current policy of dispa-
rate gender treatment in job assignment is established. The influ-
ence of job classification on compensation is treated by such an
omission as if it was the influence of gender on compensation.
It is of course quite possible, although not established simply by
means of the hypothesis that it is possible that job differences vari-
ables will mask or cover up other independent variables, including
gender.2 8 For example, a regression analysis which treats job dif-
duct for reasons independent of illicit (gender) motive. See Chiplin, supra note 66, at 255;
Ramsay, supra, note 219, at 39-40. It is crucial that the meaning assigned the term "dis-
crimination" by the statistician conforms to the meaning assigned that term by the control-
ling legal conception of the prohibition. See Bloom & Killingsworth, supra note 199, at 327
n.7.
238. See, e.g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 332 (5th Cir.
1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978) (inclusion of a variable reflecting employer practice
itself challenged as discriminatory is improper); Blumrosen, supra note 8, at 415-70 (wage
differentials are linked to job segregation); Finkelstein, supra note 142, at 744 (criticizing
court's refusal, in Agarwal v. McKee & Co. 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 8301 (N.D. Cal. 1977) to
accept a regression study which omitted job level because job assignment "may have been
tainted by discrimination"); Finkelstein, supra note 142, at 742 (rank should be included as
a variable only where employer proves that neutral and objective standards were applied in
granting rank). Cf. Bloom & Killingsworth, supra note 199, at 328-30 (where analysis is
restricted to a limited sample, e.g. a particular job category-and where selection bias taints
access to that sample, salary discrimination within the sample may go undetected if omitted
productivity factors which influence salary within the sample are corrrelated with omitted
productivity factors which influence access to the sample).
The difficulty with this position is that it presumes discrimination by failing to take into
account a relevant variable without proof that the variable was in fact tainted by disparate
treatment. To omit a relevant variable because there is a risk, e.g., that the employer en-
gaged in job assignment or promotion discrimination, (as distinguished from omission be-
cause it is established that the employer currently engages in such conduct) is effectively to
impose a disparate impact model. The influence of the omitted variable will be character-
ized as "discrimination" because it will magnify the value of regression coefficient for the
group status variable under circumstances in which it is not established that the omitted
variable constitutes in fact a gender variable. The allocation of the burden of proof and the
character of that burden following Gunther are crucial here. Even if it is assumed, however,
that the employer has a burden of persuasion, that burden, under a disparate treatment
theory, is to establish a credible gender neutral reason for a compensation decision. It is not
a burden to establish use of a criterion free of risks of disparate treatment. See infra notes
262-76 and accompanying text.
It is the case that the use of independent variable in a regression study which are related
to each other, a problem of multicollinearity, will bias the study's estimates of the influence
of such variables on the dependent variable (compensation). See, e.g., BALDUS & COLE,
supra note 51 at 273-76; Fisher, supra note 199, at 713; SALARY EQUrry, supra note 216, at
38-40. In the present context, it is of course known that there is both widespread job segre-
gation by gender and substantial differentials in compensation by gender. There is, in short,
a relationship between gender and jobs, job levels, occupational groups, etc. What is not
known is the reason for that relationship. Although de facto job segregation is an observed
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ferences as a gender neutral explanation of a compensation differ-
ential ignores the possibility of job assignment discrimination. This
possibility is, however, precisely the possibility the policies under-
lying the equal work standard will not permit to be assumed by a
court. To the extent that the job, and any other gender neutral
cause claimed by an employer as an explanation of compensation,
whether or not that variable is quantifiable, is ignored as an expla-
nation of a differential discovered across jobs and replaced with
proxy variables for productivity,5 9 the resulting regression study
fact, it is not necessarily the case that job segregation is the consequence of disparate treat-
ment on the part of employers.
The cure for multicollinearity is omission of the variable creating the problem, but that
omission generates mispecification. BALDUS & COLE supra note 51, at 275 n.3; SALARY Eq-
urry, supra note 216, at 39, 42. The choice between multicollinearity and mispecification is a
choice to be made on policy grounds. See id. at 39-40. If mispecification is risked, a dispa-
rate impact standard is imposed. The omitted variable is not a consideration upon which
the employer may rely because it is correlated with gender, not because it constitutes gen-
der. See Chiplin, supra note 66, at 259. If multicollinearity is risked, a disparate treatment
standard is imposed. The statistical significance of the influence of a gender variable on
compensation will decline where an independent variable correlated with gender but gender
neutral in character is included in the study. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 51, at 275, 275
n.3; SALARY EQurry, supra note 216, at 39, 40-44.
239. Gwartney, supra note 88, at 657 n.68, 658, argues that proxy variables for produc-
tivity should be utilized in regression studies whether or not those variables constitute a
part of an employer's formal wage determination. The employer's informal guesses about
employee productivity are to be quantified by the formal imposition of proxy variables. In
part, this is an argument favoring a new definition of the job relatedness component of the
business necessity defense to disparate impact theory. Compensation is job related if it can
be explained by a statistically significant relationship with race or gender neutral proxy
variables imposed by a court whether or not the employer relied in fact upon such race or
gender neutral considerations. Id. My difficulty with the argument is that it substitutes an
economic efficiency policy for fact finding. What the employer did in fact is less important
than whether the consequences of the employer's actions are consistent with profit max-
imization. Cf. Flynn, The Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw. R.
U. L. REv. 335, 343 (1981) (criticizing use of the economic theory as substituting presupposi-
tions of the theoretical model for fact finding).
For purposes of the present discussion, my specific difficulty with any use of proxy vari-
ables which are not at least close quantifiable approximations of what the employer did in
fact is that such a use is inconsistent with the assumptions of a disparate treatment prohibi-
tion. Economic efficiency might well be characterized as an appropriate consideration for
purposes of impact theory, for the business necessity defense, in effect, balances disparate
consequences against efficiency concerns. But a disparate treatment prohibition is concerned
with what occurred in fact as an expression of a policy precluding illiicitly motivated em-
ployer decision; it is not a balancing test. To the extent that a regression analysis utilizes
proxy variables which explain components of a differential, it may be inferred that the em-
ployer's guesses regarding productivity took those variables (or considerations related to the
variables) into account. But the inference that any unexplained component of a differential
is gender based is suspect precisely because the regression has only imperfectly approxi-
mated the employer's actual decision making process.
I would, however, propose an exception to this line of argument. If a plaintiff is permitted
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has substituted the statistician's version of appropriate or poten-
tially appropriate criteria for decision""0 for the employer's criteria
for decision.
to utilize a regression, employing variables the plaintiff thinks plausibly explain a differen-
tial, the defendant ought to be permitted to do likewise in rebuttal on the basis of the same
evidentiary foundation required of the plaintiff. The defendant is otherwise disadvantaged
by a judicial acceptance of artificiality good only for one class of parties' litigant.
240. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 656-58 (4th
Cir. 1983); Heagney v. Univ. of Washington, 642 F.2d 1157,1164 (9th Cir. 1981); Roman v.
ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1355 (4th Cir. 1976). To the extent that a regression study attrib-
utes a dependent (salary) variable to gender by ignoring a gender neutral independent varia-
ble, it imposes liability for reasons of consequences rather than for reasons of illicit motiva-
tion. It therefore imposes a disparate impact prohibition by treating a salary differential as,
pro tanto, an effect of the ignored variable. The effect of the ignored variable on the depen-
dent salary variable will be reflected in the regression study's independent gender variable.
It is of course quite possible to ignore an independent job assignment variable where jobs
are substantially different on the ground that the plaintiff has established that job assign-
ment was discriminatory (on either a disparate impact or a disparate treatment theory).
But, if that is the case, the regression study is in effect being used to calculate a back pay
remedy for job assignment or promotion discrimination. On the assumption that the job
assignment or promotion discrimination was properly and timely charged, the effect of that
discrimination will be reflected in the regression coefficient for gender as an influence (or
cause) of the dependent salary variable. If the assumption is instead that job assignment or
promotion discrimination was not timely charged, ignoring job assignment as a variable in a
regression study targeted at compensation discrimination, is in effect the imposition of a
present effects of past discrimination theory; again a variation of a disparate impact theme.
It is the imposition of a present effects theory because the study's regression coefficient for
gender will reflect the influence of job assignment and, therefore, of past discrimination in
job assignment; past discrimination is arguably not remediable by a direct attack on that
discrimination because it is time barred. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250
(1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); Trabucco v. Delta Airlines, 590
F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1979); Farris v. Bd. Educ. of St. Louis, 576 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978);
Masco v. United Air Lines, Inc., 574 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1978). Note, however, that current
employer policy segregating jobs by gender would render the resulting compensation differ-
entials infected by disparate treatment. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text. In
that event, a regression study which ignored job assignment might be useful as a measure of
remedy.
The risk of an imposition of an impact prohibition would appear equally present under
either of the two primary means of presenting a regression study. Under the first of these
means, a single equation giving the average effect of independent variables (including a gen-
der variable) upon a dependent compensation variable is given. To the extent that the gen-
der variable, within the parameters of tests of statistical significance, influences compensa-
tion, discrimination may be inferred. Under the second approach, separate equations for
males and females are calculated. Significant differences in the regression coefficients for
productivity proxies for males and females may indicate that females are given less than
males for the same qualifications. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 51, at 262-64; Finkelstein,
supra note 142, at 739-40 n.12. Under the first approach, omission of a job assignment varia-
ble will be reflected in the gender variable. Under the second approach, omission will be
reflected in the productivity proxy variables. Cf. id. at 740 (inclusion of a marriage variable
in separate male and female equations in Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 458 F.
Supp. 314 (W.D. N.Car. 1978) can conceal discrimination); Haworth supra note 230, at 163
(reporting possibility of similar distortion).
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It is fully permissible within the conceptual boundaries of a dis-
parate treatment prohibition to question the credibility of an em-
ployer's claimed reliance upon some gender neutral criterion unre-
lated to productivity.2 41 And it is equally permissible within those
boundaries to disregard an employer's claimed reliance upon a cri-
terion (independent variable) itself tainted by disparate treat-
ment.242 But a judicial decision to disregard the influence of a
facially gender neutral criterion upon compensation is not war-
ranted absent a factual finding founded upon proof in individual
cases that an employer's reliance on such a criterion is pretextual
or that the criterion is tainted by currently remediable disparate
treatment .2 4  Absent proof that an employer currently and inten-
tionally engages in disparate treatment in job assignments, such a
decision assumes that job differences are, despite their gender neu-
241. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussing pretextual disparate
treatment).
242. A number of courts have expressed concern about the use of tainted variables,
but have unfortunately done so in terms of the potential for taint rather than in terms of
the actual presence of taint. See, e.g., Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56,
72 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Sdgar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690, 712 (D.D.C. 1981); Trout v.
Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873, 885 (D.D.C. 1981); Greenspan v. Auto. Club of Mich., 495 F.
Supp. 1021, 1064 (E.D. Mich. 1980). The appropriate analysis from a disparate treatment
perspective is to require proof of taint. See Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 511 F.
Supp. 917, 944-45 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 674 F.2d 56 (D.C.Cir. 1982). Cf.
Pope v. City of Hickory, N.C., 679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1982) (disparate impact theory may
be applied only to specific neutral procedures adapted by an employer); Pouncy v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); Heagney v. Univ. of Washing-
ton, 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981) (disparate impact theory may not be applied to
subjective decisional criteria). If it is assumed that the employer has the burden of proof
regarding disparate treatment, it may legitimately be claimed that the employer must af-
firmatively establish the legitimacy of its proposed explanatory variables. But the standard
under which legitimacy is then judged should not be proof of "objective standards". Valen-
tino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 73 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Rather, the stan-
dard should be that the employer has asserted a "factor other than sex." Cf. Texas Dep't.
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (question of imposition of burden of
persuasion on employer treated as separated issue from question of what the employer must
prove; court of appeals erred both in imposing burden of persuasion and in requiring proof
that person hired was more qualified than plaintiff); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567 (1978) (employer must prove that it based decision on a legitimate consideration; it
need not prove that it acted so as to employ the most minority employees it could consistent
with its business interests).
243. See supra note 192 (time barred claims of discrimination). Cf. Finkelstein, supra
note 142, at 746 (productivity variable tainted by time barred discrimination is legitimately
used as an explanatory variable in a regression study after United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,
431 U.S. 553 (1977). But see Valentino v. United States Postal Serv. 674 F.2d 56, 71 n.26
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (need not always control for time frame); Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp.
873, 885 (D.D.C. 1981) (pre-Act discrimination may be included in regression if it continues
to effect post-Act compensation).
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tral character, an insufficient justification for a compensation dif-
ferential. And this conclusion is not altered by an assumption that
the employer has the burden of persuasion on the issue of dispa-
rate treatment. In that event, it is the employer's burden to estab-
lish that it relied on a "factor other than sex"; it is not the em-
ployer's burden to establish that it relied upon "objective
standards" or upon standards which are justified by "necessity.
'24
4
The possibility of promotion or assignment discrimination may be
a possibility to be taken into account in assessing the credibility of
an affirmative defense, but a requirement that an employer justify
the gender neutral factor relied upon in asserting such a defense is
effectively to impose a disparate impact theory in the guise of an
allocation of a risk of non-persuasion.
45
It is, then, possible that regression can be an effective tool for
identifying the influence of gender upon compensation, but the use
of that tool must be tailored both to the legal issue (disparate
treatment) sought to be informed by that tool and the legal poli-
cies governing the adjudication of that issue. Because significant
differences in jobs must be accounted for by the regression tool if
the policies underlying the equal work standard are to be enforced
by means of a disparate treatment prohibition, the tool's potential
usefulness under Gunther is extremely limited. Indeed, it is gener-
ally limited to those cases which could be brought under the Equal
Pay Act - cases in which jobs are "substantially equal.
' 4
5. Perpetuation of Past Discrimination
In I. U.E. v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation,4 7 the plaintiffs
alleged that the employer had, prior to 1965, both intentionally
segregated jobs by gender and explicitly adopted wage rates for fe-
male jobs lower than wage rates for male jobs rated as equal under
an internally adopted job evaluation system.4 8 In 1965, the em-
ployer eliminated its dual wage policy. The plaintiffs in Westing-
house alleged, however, that the employer perpetuated its former
244. See supra note 242. For examples of this difficulty, see Valentino v. United
States Postal Serv. 674 F.2d 56, 73 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (requiring employer proof of "ob-
jective" standards in making promotion decision before job level may be included as an
explanatory variable); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 313
(N.D. Tex. 1980) (employer failed to justify claim that omitted variables should have been
included through proof of business necessity for such variables).
245. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
246. See Nelson, supra note 33, at 260.
247. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
248. Id. at 1097. See Newman & Vonhoff, supra note 8, at 292-96.
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policy by expanding the number of its pay grades and ranking jobs
predominantly staffed by women at pay grades lower than pay
grades assigned jobs predominantly staffed by men.2 49 Although
the Third Circuit confined its opinion in Westinghouse to the issue
ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court in Gunther, it charac-
terized the plaintiffs' theory as alleging "explicit discrimination in
compensation."
2 50
It should be apparent that the employer's pre-1965 policy would
be subject to attack within the scope of the narrow theory of liabil-
ity advocated here if that policy had continued after the effective
date of Title VII. The employer engaged in a policy of job segrega-
tion,2 51 a policy of acting inconsistently with an internally adopted
evaluation plan 2 2 and an explicitly stated policy of differential
compensation founded on gender.253 It should also be apparent
that, if the employer sought intentionally to perpetuate its pre-
1965 policies through the pretextual use of a facially unisexual
schedule of pay grades, the post-1965 use of such a schedule would
equally fall within the boundaries of the narrow theory of liability
advocated here. The difficult question is that of an acceptable
method of proof of such a pretextual use of the schedule.
Unfortunately, the Third Circuit's opinion in Westinghouse does
not provide much guidance regarding the latter question. The
plaintiffs in that case pointed to the facts that the employer
adopted a unisex schedule of pay grades which "generally" placed
jobs predominantly staffed by women at grades below jobs
predominantly staffed 'by men, that the unisex schedule placed fe-
male jobs below male jobs which had been at corresponding grade
levels prior to 1965, and that jobs in the employer's plant in 1975
continued to be segregated, de facto, by gender.2 " The dissent in
Westinghouse, relying upon the plaintiffs' answers to interrogato-
ries, characterized the plaintiffs' proposed method of proof as the
use of comparative work evidence; that is, evidence comparing the
skills, effort, responsibilities and working conditions of predomi-
nantly male and predominantly female jobs in terms of the opin-
ions of the plaintiffs' expert.25 Changes in job content and com-
249. 631 F.2d at 1097-98.
250. Id. at 1107.
251. Id. at 1097. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
252. 631 F.2d at 1097. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
253. 631 F.2d at 1097-98. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
254. 631 F.2d at 1097-98.
255. 631 F.2d at 1109 & n.5 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
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pensation rates following the employer's 1965 adoption of a unisex
pay grade schedule would arguably make such comparisons essen-
tial if the plaintiffs were to show a continuation of the employer's
pre-1965 policies.256
Comparative worth evidence of the character contemplated by
the Westinghouse dissent, evidence, in effect, constituting a job
evaluation analysis developed by the plaintiff,157 might be profer-
red for one of two purposes. It might be proffered for the purpose
of establishing the similarity of the employer's existing compensa-
tion system to its pre-1965 compensation system or it might be
proferred for the purpose of establishing the fairness, on the value
premises of the plaintiff's job evaluator, of the employer's existing
system. 8  The former purpose appears consistent with a theory
that the employer's existing compensation system constitutes a
current policy of disparate treatment in compensation. The latter
purpose imposes a disparate impact theory.
There is of course a substantial risk that evidence proferred for
the former purpose will be used by a court for the latter purpose,
and that risk is exacerbated by the occasionally indistinct line be-
tween a pure perpetuation theory and a pretext theory.'59 A pure
perpetuation theory attacks a gender neutral employer practice as
carrying forward into the present the effects of past instances of
discrimination. 26 0 A pretext theory attacks a facially gender neutral
256. See Newman & Vonhoff, supra note 8, at 295 n.116.
257. See 631 F.2d at 1109 n.5 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
258. See Newman & Vonhoff, supra note 8 at 295. Newman and Vonhoff speak both
in terms of a continuation of the employer's pre-1965 policies and in terms of the perpetua-
tion of "wage inequities", terminology which makes it at least unclear whether they have
distinguished a disparate treatment theory from an unfairness theory.
259. See Newman & Vonhoff, supra note 8 at 323. Newman and Vonhoff, like Profes-
sor Blumrosen, would make evidence of job segregation sufficient for a prima facie case of
discrimination. Unlike Blumrosen, they would apparently require proof of purposeful dis-
crimination. Id. What is unclear is whether they would adopt a wage discrimination theory
to attack the present compensation effects of past instances of purposeful employer job seg-
regation. See Id.
260. The perpetuation of past discrimination theory was originally formulated as a
means of attacking race neutral seniority systems which perpetuated, most often by means
of departmental seniority or no transfer rules, pre-Title VII hiring discrimination. See
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). The theory was abrogated
in the context of seniority systems in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977). In contexts not entailing seniority systems immunized by Section 703h of Title VII,
29 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976), Title VII's charge filing periods preclude use of perpetuation
theory, at least absent proof of a continuation into the filing period of the underlying em-
ployer policy thought to be discriminatory. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250 (1980); United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
It is of course apparent that whether the plaintiff is relying merely upon the present ef-
Vol. 22:65
1983 County of Washington v. Gunther
compensation scheme as the means used by an employer to accom-
plish a present policy of disparate treatment.
To the extent that job comparisons are narrowly tailored to the
question of the present continuation of a policy conceded to entail
disparate treatment, the use of such comparisons is unobjection-
able. To the extent, however, that such comparisons are used in-
stead to establish that a gender neutral employment practice has
the effect of perpetuating a past and nonremediable act or policy
of disparate treatment, they are used to impose a disparate impact
prohibition.2 6 1 In Westinghouse, evidence that women overwhelm-
ingly staffed job classifications placed by the employer in low pay
grades in combination with evidence that the employer once en-
gaged in a policy of job segregation suggested that the compensa-
tion effects of that past policy were continuing. From the perspec-
tive of a disparate impact theory, such effects, to the extent not
justified by differences in the worth of jobs within distinct pay
grades as disclosed by the plaintiff's job evaluation, would warrant
liability. From the perspective of a disparate treatment theory, the
fects of time-barred discrimination or is asserting a theory of current discrimination is a
matter both of characterization and of judicial receptivity to the latter theory. In a sense, all
disparate impact theory cases are perpetuation theory cases. The employer's use of a race
and gender neutral criterion is unlawful because of its disparate impact, but disparate im-
pact is a function of past wrongs. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)
(education and testing requirements give present effect to past societal discrimination with
respect to education).
For present purposes, a wage discrimination theory which relies upon job segregation may
be characterized in any one of three ways affecting its viability as a theory of present (rather
than perpetuated) discrimination. First, the theory may be viewed as seeking to remedy the
present compensation "effects" of past and time-barred job assignment discrimination. To
the extent that the theory seeks to impose a valuation scheme for comparing the relative
worth of jobs predominantly staffed by males and jobs predominantly staffed by females,
this characterization appears accurate. Pay "inequity", under the valuation assumption of
the imposed scheme, is to be remedied because of existing segregation. Second, the theory
may be viewed as stating a theory of present wage discrimination to the extent that it relies
on present and purposeful employer job segregation. Although such job segregation is itself
remediable (unless the BFOQ defense is applicable) and although the compensation conse-
quences of job segregation may be remediable on a theory of liability for job segregation, the
fact remains that there is a gender element to compensation paid at a time at which access
to a higher paying male job is barred to females. See supra text accompanying notes 186-98.
Third, the theory may be viewed as seeking to derive an inference of present compensation
discrimination from the facts of job segregation and lower rates of compensation for jobs
dominated by females. The coincidence raises an inference that the jobs dominated by fe-
males are compensated at a lower rate because they are dominated by females. Although
such a theory of inference states a theory of present discrimination, the inference is weak,
since there are explanations of the lower rate independent of employer reliance upon
gender.
261. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349-50 (1977) (charac-
terizing perpetuation theory as an instance of impact theory).
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question presented by such effects was whether they reflected past
or current employer policy. Was the employer's facially gender
neutral post-1965 assignment of job classifications to pay grades in
fact not gender neutral? Evidence of the similarity of such post-
1965 assignments to the employer's pre-1965 policy would be pro-
bative of that question. The plaintiff's job evaluation, if it dupli-
cated the employer's pre-1965 evaluative practices and disclosed a
continuation of those practices, might also be probative of that
question. The function of such evidence within the confines of a
disparate treatment model is, however, to raise inferences about
the employer's current motivation for its actions, not its historical
motivation for its past actions.
6. The Burden of Proof
Under County of Washington v. Gunther, the Bennett Amend-
ment incorporates the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses.
2' 2
Those affirmative defenses state, albeit in negative form, a dispa-
rate treatment theory. The employer is not liable if it can establish
that it did not engage in disparate treatment.26 3 Although the Gun-
ther opinion fails to provide guidance regarding appropriate
schemes of proof and defense in post-Gunther compensation dis-
crimination cases, it is at least a fair inference that the affirmative
defense characterization of the Equal Pay Act's exceptions will be
retained for Title VII purposes.'" The immediate questions are
what should a plaintiff be required to establish for purposes of a
prima facie case and what standards should govern judicial assess-
ment of an employer's rebuttal.
There are three potential approaches to the Gunther Court's
conclusion that the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses are as-
sertable in a Title VII action alleging gender discrimination in
compensation. First, that conclusion might be viewed as authoriz-
ing a plaintiff to establish comparable worth or value, under any of
the versions of comparable worth theory earlier canvassed here, as
a prima facie case.265 A prima facie case, under this version of a
262. 452 U.S. at 169.
263. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
264. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982); Barnett, supra note
163, at 1698; Note, Proving Wage Discrimination, supra note 163, at 314-15; but see Lam-
phere v. Brown University, 685 F.2d 743 (1st Cir. 1982); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257,
285 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Boyd v. Madison County Mut. Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1981);
Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
265. See Comment, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination After County of Washington v.
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post-Gunther proof schema, would not be directed to an issue of
disparate treatment, but rather to an issue of equity or fairness
under the valuation premises of the mode of comparison adopted
by a plaintiff."' The employer would then be required to rebut
that showing by establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that it had not engaged in disparate treatment. Second, the Court's
conclusion may be viewed as authorizing a plaintiff to establish, by
any evidence available to it, a credible inference of disparate treat-
ment. Although evidence of job segregation or evidence of compa-
rable value might in some circumstances give rise to such an infer-
ence, the plaintiff's prima facie case would have to be consistent
with the ultimate issue to be addressed by an employer's rebuttal.
The prima facie case should logically support an inference of dis-
parate treatment. Once a prima facie case was established, the de-
fendant would be compelled to rebut it - again by establishing by a
preponderance of evidence that it had not engaged in disparate
treatment. 6" Third, the Court's conclusion may be viewed as in
Gunther, 81 COLUM. L. Rav. 1333, 1346-47 (1981); Comment, Equal Pay for Comparable
Work, 15 HARv. C.R. - C.L.,L. REV. 475 (1980); Note, Equal Pay, Comparable Work, and
Job Evaluation, 90 YALE L.J. 657 (1981).
266. See Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under Title VII Disparate Impact
Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. Rv. 1083, 1095-1100 (1982) (criticizing comparable worth as a means
of proving disparate impact). But see id. at 1092-95 (advocating use of disparate impact
theory in a largely unspecified manner).
Although it is apparent that de facto job segregation in combination with a male-female
wage differential in a single firm may give rise to an inference of disparate treatment in
compensation, the many potential legitimate reasons for such a phenomenon render the in-
ference rather weak. See generally Nelson, supra note 33. Similarly, a plaintiff's job evalua-
tion, unless it is also the job evaluation actually used by a defendant, assumes the valuation
premises of the plaintiff, not the productivity premises of the employer. Its acceptance by a
court as sufficient for a prima facie case would amount to a judicial approval of the plain-
tiff's value premises, not to a conclusion that disparate treatment could be inferred from the
evaluation. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. A plaintiff's multivariate regres-
sion study might be used either to establish an inference of disparate treatment or as a
means of imposing, again as a matter of a prima facie case, the plaintiff's view of appropri-
ate valuation of unequal work. Which purpose judicial acceptance of such a study would
serve would depend upon the plaintiff's selection and measurement of proxy variables and
the degree to which the selected proxies fit the employer's guesses regarding productivity.
See supra notes 230-46 and accompanying text.
267. Although the Ninth Circuit's references to the question of the "reasonableness"
of the employer's use of a gender neutral criterion in Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d
873, 878 (9th Cir. 1982) may be viewed as requiring a showing of necessity or justification
rather than a showing of gender-neutral decision in a post-Gunther compensation case, it
appears that those references were intended to state a standard for assessing employer cred-
ibility. On that premise, Kouba would be consistent with the second version of appropriate
post-Gunther analysis.
The Supreme Court has permitted evidence of statistically disparate consequences to
form a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
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fact not incorporating the affirmative defense characterization, but
merely as authorizing only a disparate treatment theory as the ap-
propriate theory for approaching a Title VII claim of gender dis-
crimination in compensation. Under this view, the burden of per-
suasion would remain, as in other disparate treatment cases
brought under Title VII, on the plaintiff.26 At most, the defendant
would have a burden of production in rebutting a prima facie case
from which disparate treatment could be inferred.2
The distinctions between these approaches are crucial. The first
approach assumes the viability of comparable worth (of pay equity
between males and females as groups) as a legal command and
postulates a special privilege, the affirmative defense of a factor
other than gender. Although employers, particularly employers
with express and highly rationalized compensation policies, might
find it relatively easy to invoke that privilege, the temptation to
narrowly construe the privilege in cases in which an employer can
rely only upon its protestations of good faith guesses regarding rel-
ative productivity will be great.7 Moreover, if the employer's "af-
firmative defense" is construed as a privilege or special plea in jus-
tification, there is a risk that judicial standards for assessing the
viability of the employer's claim will, in the guise of inquiry into
the credibility of the claim, take the form of inquiry into the neces-
sity of the claim.1 In short, judicial acceptance of the premise
433 U.S. 299 (1979). It has however insisted that the ultimate issue is intentional discrimi-
nation, that disparity must give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination, and that
the employer is entitled to challenge the prima facie case with evidence that undermines the
inference of intent arising from it. Id. at 299-300; Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
268. See Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
269. See the employer's argument, rejected by the Ninth Circuit, in Kouba v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1982).
270. See Gwartney, supra note 88, at 657 n.68 (employers often rely upon estimates of
productivity not rationalized or expressed in terms comporting either with job evaluation or
human capital theory). WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 17, at 72 (employers often
use job evaluation to "capture" or make explicit existing compensation policy). Query
whether a court adopting this version would permit employer rebuttal by means, e.g., of a
multiple regression study which, utilizing gender neutral proxy variables selected by the
employer but generally recognized as viable proxies for productivity, completely explained
compensation differentials without reference to gender where the study was undertaken in
preparation for litigation. See Finkelstein, supra note 142, at 744-45. If a court concludes
that such a study is an after the fact rationalization, has it not imposed liability on the basis
of the plaintiff's prima facie case, a case established by means of a plaintiff's job evaluation
of the jobs in question?
271. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1982). It is unfortu-
nately a short step between asking whether the employer's claimed reason for a differential
is credible and asking whether that reason is necessary to the efficient conduct of the em-
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that male and female workers as groups should be compensated
fairly or equitably risks a narrow construction of the employer's
"absence of disparate treatment" defense and risks strict scrutiny
of the employer's gender neutral reasons for disparate compensa-
tion effects - risks inconsistent with the congressional policies un-
derlying the equal work standard.27
The second approach does not treat the employer's affirmative
defense as a privilege or plea in justification. Rather, it treats the
central issue of the case as disparate treatment, requires the plain-
tiff's case to address that issue, and imposes the risk of non-per-
suasion on the employer once the plaintiff has established an infer-
ence of disparate treatment sufficient to warrant a finding in the
plaintiff's favor. 7 s The employer's affirmative defense does not
take the form an affirmative defense takes in, for example, the law
of tort or criminal law; it is not a justification or privilege assert-
able in avoidance of liability for conduct conceded to be unlawful
absent justification or privilege. Rather, the defense is merely a
step in a logical progression of steps designed to reach an ultimate
question regarding the lawfulness of conduct.2 74 More importantly,
ployer's business. Compare Dothard v'Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (employer had
other means of furthering its interest which would produce a lesser disparate impact) with
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (once employer establishes job
relatedness in a disparate impact case, plaintiff may prove pretext). See also Valentino v.
United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 72-73 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
272. What is risked is the imposition of a disparate impact prohibition. The point is
perhaps best illustrated by the potential use of multiple regression. A plaintiff might, for
example, attempt to establish a prima facie case by use of a regression study which includes
as explanatory variables only productivity variables, i.e., human capital variables which fo-
cus upon worker characteristics. An employer might then be required to affirmatively prove
that it relied on factors "other than sex." One potential means of doing so is to introduce a
regression study which includes both additional productivity considerations omitted from
the plaintiff's study and job characteristic variables such as job differences and job or grade
levels. The employer's additional productivity factors are subject to the objection that they
are mere proxies for the employer's subjective guesses about productivity and ,were not in
fact considered by the employer. The employer's job characteristics variables are subject to
the objection that they mask potential or possible discrimination in hiring or promotion.
See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
If the employer has the burden of proof, a court may be warranted in requiring the em-
ployer to make some showing that the variables claimed by the employer are gender neutral.
But a requirement that the employer affirmatively establish that the variables are "neces-
sary" or "job related" is also a possibility. Id. at 313.
273. The approach is suggested by cases in which a plaintiff's failure to account for job
differences in a regression study prompted rejection of the study. See, e.g., Valentino v.
United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wilkins v. Univ. of Houston,
654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981).
274. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The second ap-
proach is essentially the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Green prior to the Supreme Court's
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the second approach does not adopt the premise that fairness or
equity between male and female workers as groups, as defined by
the premises of a selected basis for comparison of values, as the
premise to be rebutted. It does not therefore implicitly adopt the
regulatory balancing of interests approach underlying a disparate
impact theory.7 5 The question is whether the employer was moti-
vated by gender; it is not whether the employer's decision com-
ports with a judicially defined standard of the value of work or
whether the decision is necessary, under such a standard, to the
employer's pursuit of its legitimate interests.
The third approach is consistent with the second but imposes
the risk of non-persuasion on the plaintiff. It is therefore consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's view of appropriate analysis in Title
VII disparate treatment cases not entailing gender discrimination
in compensation claims. It is, of course, inconsistent with charac-
terizing the Equal Pay Act exceptions incorporated, under Gun-
ther, as affirmative defenses. There is nevertheless a justification,
beyond symmetry, for viewing Gunther's interpretation of the
Bennett Amendment as requiring use of Title VII's usual disparate
treatment approach rather than as incorporating affirmative de-
fenses. There is nothing in the nature of a gender discrimination in
compensation claim which would warrant the imposition of a
greater burden of proof on the employer than is the case in other,
race and gender, claims of disparate treatment brought under Title
VII. Indeed, the policies underlying the Equal Pay Act's equal
work standard - policies emphasized by the court in Gunther in
referring to the Equal Pay Act's fourth affirmative defense - sug-
gest that the normal allocation of the risk of judicial error to the
plaintiff should be maintained in the present context.
2 7 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Underlying the distinct and often inconsistent theories of Title
VII liability, disparate treatment and disparate impact, are distinct
and often inconsistent policy objectives; equal treatment of indi-
viduals and equal achievement for groups.2  The legal conceptions
decision in Texas Dept. Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See East v.
Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975).
275. See supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
276. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). Cases involving dis-
parate racial treatment in compensation follow the Burdine allocation of burden of proof.
See Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981).
277. See Fiss, supra note 108, at 237-40. See also Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of
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invoked by each theory, illicit motive in the case of disparate treat-
ment, insufficiently justified disparities in the benefits received by
or burdens imposed upon distinct groups in the case of disparate
impact, express and impose those distinct policies. 78
The disadvantage inherent in a disparate treatment theory is
that it is extraordinarily difficult to discover illicit motive. The ju-
dicial response to that disadvantage has been to infer illicit motive
from evidence of the disparate consequences employer action may
have on groups protected by the legislation.2 79 The disadvantage
inherent in a disparate impact theory is that it subjects employer
decision, decision presumed by disparate impact theory to have
been motivated by considerations independent of race or gender,
to intensive reevaulation by the judiciary.2 80 It should be obvious
that the more willing a court to infer illicit motive from disparate
consequences, the more the court moves in the conceptual and
therefore policy direction of a disparate impact model. It should be
equally obvious, therefore, that such a willing court incurs greater
and greater risks of imposing the regulatory disadvantage inherent
in a disparate impact theory as it becomes more willing to infer
motive from consequence.
It is the risk of regulatory intrusion which Congress sought to
preclude by means of the equal work standard in enacting the
Equal Pay Act.2 81 The Supreme Court, in Gunther, circumvented
that means of preclusion by narrowly construing the Bennett
Amendment to Title VII. It has been the contention here, however,
that the Court imposed a distinct means of accomplishing that
same end. Disparate treatment is the sole available theory for im-
posing Title VII liability for post-Gunther claims of gender dis-
Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 262-65 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
278. See Cox, supra note 47, at 213-18 (arguing that illicit motive conception is not
merely a self-blinding conceptual excuse for decision, but a means of expressing a policy and
confining decision within the boundaries established by that policy, and arguing further that
a decision to adopt an effects and balancing test for decision is a choice of a distinct policy).
279. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
280. It is recognized that this may not be thought a disadvantage by some. Congress of
course thought it a disadvantage in enacting the Equal Pay Act's equal work standard,
supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text, but the potential criticism should perhaps be
more directly answered. The primary disadvantage of judicial regulation is that courts are
poorly designed to anticipate the sociological and economic consequences of the sort of
broad policy decisions contemplated by comparable worth theory. See Meltzer, supra note
131, at 457-59. Thet difficulty aside, courts are also poor legimators of such policy decisions.
See Cox, Book Review, 1982 UTAH L. REV. - (forthcoming).
281. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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crimination in compensation. Whether these means will success-
fully preclude regulatory intrusion is dependent upon the
discipline with which the courts adhere to illicit motive as the legal
conception underlying the disparate treatment prohibition and,
therefore, upon the degree of their willingness to infer motive from
disparate group consequences.
It has not been the contention here that inference from conse-
quence is never warranted. Rather, the contention has been that
compensation disparities are the consequence of diverse phenom-
ena only some of which are potentially attributable to illicit em-
ployer motivation. A court which uncritically assumes that compo-
nents of a compensation differential not explicable by reference to
the objective standards an economist or job evaluator may assert
as theoretical explanations of compensation imposes a discrimina-
tion prohibition far broader in meaning and scope than a disparate
treatment theory would permit. It may be that there are only a
limited number of factors which plausibly explain compensation
within the boundaries of an economic theory of compensation,282
but a court is not, absent congressional acceptance of such a the-
ory, entitled to adopt those boundaries. What a court is entitled to
do is to utilize evidence of the employer's actual behavior, to criti-
cally examine and use evidence of disparate consequences where
probative of and confined to the issue of illicit motive, and to im-
pose liability for the reason of illicit motive where discovered. The
mood with which a court should approach that task is a mood of
humility, humility in the sense that the immediate achievement of
fair and equitable shares of the compensation pie for male and fe-
male workers as groups is not, absent legislative action, the court's
legitimate objective."'
282. Fisher, supra note 199, at 724.
283. Cf. Mincer, supra note 66, at 284 ("although it may be 'traditional'. .. to mea-
sure discrimination by the residual - after various other factors have been netted out - I
think a more humble attitude is to think of the residual as a measure of our ignorance
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